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Inrecentyears the internationalcommunity has been developing
variousinternationalcodes of conduct, many of which will contain rules
governingthe behavior of transnationalcorporations(TNCs). Most of
these rules are being developed with little or no direct TNCpartic#pation. Professor Charney argues that because TNCs represent major,
independent centers of influencefailureto include them in the codes of
conduct negotiationsmay result in rules that do not accurately reflect
the realitiesof TNC interests andpower. If the internationalcommunity laterseeks to convert these rules into legalnorms, TNC resistance
willprobablyplace costly strains on both the rules and the entire international legal system. Professor Charney concludes that the international community should permit TNCs and other interestedpower
groups to participatedirectly in the development of internationalnorms
applicableto their interests. But he cautions that it would be unwise to
give TNCs complete internationallegalpersonality because this, too,
mightplace undue strainson the internationallegal system.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, one of the most significant developments in public international law is the apparent creation of law applicable to transnational corporations (TNC). t Although public international law has
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I. W. FELD, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.N. POLITICS, THE QUEST FOR CODES

OF CONDUCT 1, 17-19 (1980); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 8, 171, 190-91, 374-75 (1964); Friedmann, The Uses of "GeneralPrinciples"in the Develop-

ment of InternationalLaw, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279 (1963); Sornaryah, The Myth of International
Contract Law, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 187, 198-206 (1981). Judge Jessup has characterized this
movement as "Transnational Law," thus blurring the distinction between public international
law, private international law, and domestic law. See P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2, 15, 10611 (1956); see also Escobar,Shouldthere be an InternationalRegulatoryAgencyfor MNCs in THE
NATION-STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE

To LATIN AMERICA 134, 135-37 (J. Gunnemann ed. 1975); Friedmann, 57 AM. J.INT'L L. at 281;
McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power and Policy, A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES
Cours 137, 184 (1954).
Detlev F. Vagts presents three alternatives for dealing with the problem of TNC regulation:
1. allow autonomous development of TNCs outside of the incorporation of any single
state, allowing each state to do its own regulatory job;
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addressed international economic issues for some time, recently, in
light of expanded TNC activity and increased third world leverage in
international affairs, greater attention has been focused on the establishment of rules to govern TNC behavior. These developments are
partly explained as an effort by the third world to increase its international power vis-a-vis the power of both the TNCs and the western
developed world, with whom the TNCs are generally aligned, but there
are also additional factors encouraging them. First, because one country usually cannot unilaterally regulate TNC power and behavior, even
the western, developed countries have an interest in these developments. Second, TNCs themselves recognize the benefits of a uniform
regulatory scheme that would avoid many of the difficulties produced
by varying national requirements. Although these new rules will be
aimed at TNCs, international practice has largely precluded TNCs
from directly participating in this rule-making process. It is the purpose of this article to explore what role, if any, TNCs and other nongovernmental interest groups ought to play in this process.
A. The Status Quo.
Currently, this process includes negotiations and consultations that
have taken place in the United Nations and the other international organizations and that have focused on the production of written codes of
2. create an international regulatory agency to control TNC activities consisting of representatives of nation-states;
3. continue the present system of partial international regulation but make it more uniform as nations pursue a more integrated international economy under GATT, IMF,
etc.
See Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise: A New Challengefor TransnationalLaw, 83 HARV. L.

Ray. 739, 787-91 (1970). For documentation of national and international efforts to regulate
TNCs, see Rubin, Developments in the Law andInstitutions of lnternationalEconomic Relations,
The MultinationalEnterprise at Bay, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 479-87 (1974).

The literature on multinational enterprises employs the terms Transnational Corporations
(TNC) and Multinational Entities (MNE) interchangeably. The term TNC is used here because it
conveys more clearly this article's focus on business enterprises.
There are numerous definitions of TNCs. W. F.LD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND
WORLD POLmCS, A STUDY OF BusmNss, LABOR, AND POLITICAL GROUPS 22-23 (1972). For the
purposes of this article the following definition will be used:
[A] number of affiliated business establishments which function simultaneously in different countries, are joined together by ties of common ownership or control, and are responsible to a common management strategy. From the headquarters company (and
country) flow direction and control, and from the affiliates (branches, subsidiaries and
joint enterprises) products, revenues, and information. Management may be organized in
either monocentric or polycentric fashion. In the former case, top management is centered in one headquarters company;, in the latter case, management has been divided into
geographic zones and a separate headquarters company has been established for each
zone.

Id at 23.
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TNC conduct. 2 Although the treatment accorded TNC representatives
varies considerably among these organizations, with one exception the

bnly formal participants in the development of these standards have
been nation-state representatives. In the International Labor Organi-

zation (ILO)-the exception to the rule-business and labor representatives serve on national delegations and have the right to speak and
2. Some of the codes now in place or under negotiation are the following:
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) "Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises," 15 INT'L L. MATERIALS 969 (1976), was recommended to the members
of the OECD by the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on
June 21, 1976. The OECD Council of Ministers issued a series of decisions on related subjects
concurrent with the approval of the guidelines. In 1979, a review of the guidelines and decisions
was completed and the OECD Council, meeting at the ministerial level, endorsed the Report by
the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on June 13, 1979.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) "Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy" was adopted by the ILO on November 16, 1977,
at the 204th Session of the ILO in Geneva. See 17 INT'L L. MATERIALS 423-30 (1978).
The United Nations (UN) Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations is currently
under negotiation. It is before the UN Commission on TNCs but is actually being negotiated in
the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct. See Work Related to the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of
Conduct on its Fourteenth Session, Rapporteur, Ms. L. Zanabria, to the Commission on TNCs,
7th Sess., August 31 - September 14, 1981, U.N. Doc. E/C.I0/79, (June 26, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group].
The negotiations on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology (TOT)
remain on the agenda of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
See Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. U.N. Doc. TD/CODE
TOT25, (June 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L L. MATERIALS 773 (1980).
The United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices has adopted "The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices," U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10, (May 2, 1980), reprintedin 19 INT'L L. MATERIALS 813
(1980). The United Nations General Assembly adopted these rules at its thirty-fifth session in
Resolution 35/63 of December 5, 1980. See 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 123, U.N. Doc.
A/35/48 (1981).
The United Nations has also expended efforts to develop a Code of Conduct on Corrupt
Practices. See Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices: Corrupt Practices, Particularly Illicit Payments in International Commercial Transactions: Concept and Issues
Related to the Formulation of an International Agreement, U.N. Doc. No. E/AC.64/3 (Jan. 20,
1977).
In a related development, a business group, the Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), adopted in 1972 the "Guidelines for International Investment." See ICC
Guidelines for International Investment, ICC Pub. No. 272 (1972).
The Andean Foreign Investment Code, adopted by the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement is reprinted in 16 INT'L L. MATERIALS 138 (1977). Additional provisions to the Code are
found in 21 INT'L L. MATERIALS 542 (1982). For information on the Andean Foreign Investment
Code, see Naom, TransnationalEnterprises under the Pacto Andino and National Laws of Latin
America, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (N.
Horn ed. 1980). For general information on the historical development of codes from 1972-80, see
Baade, Codes of Conductfor Multinational Enterprises: An Introductory Survey, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 407 (N. Horn ed. 1980).
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vote independently of the delegation's government members.3 In contrast, the UN generally limits business and labor representatives to observer status with, perhaps, a limited right to be present and to speak at
formal sessions.4 Because TNCs cannot represent themselves in most
international organizations, their activities 5have been limited to lobbying individual nation-state representatives.
3. Article 3(3) of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, 62 Stat. 3485,
TIAS No. 1868,4 Bevans 188, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, states: "The Members undertake to nominate nonGovernment delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial and labor organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the
case may be, in their respective countries." This tripartite system of representation requires that
all three groups be represented in every ILO activity. For a history of the ILO's tripartite system,
see Beguin, ILO and the Tparite System, 523 INT'L CONCILIATION 405 (1959). See also W.
FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 244-45 (1964); E. HAAs, BEYOND THE NATION STATE, FUNCTIONALISMAND THE INTERNATIONAL ORoANIZATION 194-95,

208-09 (1964).
4. At the UNCTAD negotiations ov these questions there is virtually no non-state participation other than through the UNCTAD secretariat and national delegations. The Commission on
TNCs has been more liberal. It has established a 15-member expert group that observes all plenary meetings of the Commission and the Intergovernmental Working Group. Business, labor,
and academia are represented in that expert group as individuals and are permitted to speak at the
formal meeting; however, they are precluded from participating at the informal negotiating sessions on the TNC Code.
In addition, among the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accredited to tha International Working Group are business and labor organizations, including the International Chamber
of Commerce, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Organization of Consumers Unions, and the International Organization of Employers. See Report of the
Intergovernmental Working Group, supra note 2, at 3. These NGOs are also permitted to observe
plenary meetings and to make oral and written presentations. See also infra note 78.
On the other hand, formal consultations with structured business and labor groups are a
regular procedure at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The OECD consults with business and labor groups through two organizations structured specifically for that purpose: the Business Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union
Advisory Committee (TUAC). BIAC and TUAC have national chapters in each of the OECD
member countries. The BIAC and TUAC organizational structures generally parallel the OECD
organization's committee structure. Formal consultations between the OECD committees and the
comparable BIAC and TUAC committees are a regular part of the OECD process. At those
meetings BIAC and TUAC present their respective positions on OECD agenda items. But the
actual OECD negotiations take place without BIAC and TUAC participation.
The Tokyo round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is also relevant to
this subject. At the Tokyo round, business representatives were excluded from direct participation. The United States, on the other hand, at least had a highly formalized structure for consulting with the private sector at home through the GATT advisory committee system. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155 (1976). It requires active, two-way consultation between the private sector and the government representative to the round. Over 1000 advisors from the private sector ultimately participated in this advisory committee system, although in the primary GATT negotiations no
individual participated as a member of the private sector. Private sector participation has been
more direct in some limited commodity discussions such as in the textile negotiations.
5. TNCs lobby by exerting political and social pressure on members of their national government at home and in the corridors at the international negotiations from which they have been
excluded. Some observers have suggested that business representatives ought to increase substantially their lobbying efforts in order to protect the relevant business interests. See Coombe, Mul-

752
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Not only are TNCs currently insulated from the international negotiating process, but, when the codes are implemented, it is likely that
their participation will be limited to domestic forums. Although a
method for implementing these codes has not been firmly established,
the current approach has been to pass resolutions in the sponsoring
organizations, which call upon the individual nation-states to implement the codes through domestic law and other less coercive means. 6
At first glance, this approach falls short of directly imposing international legal obligations on nation-states or on the TNCs. If executed on
a world-wide scale, however, the combined effect of the resolutions, the
uniform legal rules adopted by individual nation-states, and the practice of the international community could ultimately generate public
7
international law without the participation of its target, the TNCs.
tinational Codes of Conduct and Corporate Accountability: New Opportunitiesfor Corporate
Counsel, 36 Bus. LAw. 11, 27-29 (1980).
6. See supra note 2. One example from the United States involves the "Set of Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices." In the
fall of 1981 the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Justice sent a letter to a large
number of U.S. businesses endorsing the Restrictive Business Practices rules "as representing a
multilaterally-agreed set of voluntary guidelines in the antitrust field." The letter was signed by
the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, the
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, and the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. See also W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL
FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 107-08; Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of
Conductfor MultinationalEnterprises, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 4, 4 (N. Horn ed. 1980); Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the
Issue ofBinding or Voluntary Natureof InternationalCodes of ConductRegardingRestrictivePus/
ness Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. (1978); Fatouros, On the Implementation of InternationalCodes
of Conduct: An Anaosi of Future Experience, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 941, 949, 958, 960-68 (1981);
Horn, InternationalRulesfor MultinationalEnterprises: The ICC, OECD, andIL 0 Initiatives, 30
AM. U.L. REV. 923, 929 (1981); Roffe, UNCTAD: Code of Conductforthe Tranferof Technology,
Progressand Issues UnderNegotiation, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 160 (1980); Rubin, Transnational
Corporationsand InternationalCodes of Conduct: A Study of the RelationshpBetween Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 903, 916-19 (1981); Stanley, International
Codesof ConductforMNC's: 4 Skeptical View ofthe Process,30 AM. U.L. REV. 973, 976 (1981).
7. By adopting these rules, the international organizations would articulate a normative
concept. State actions leading to the evolution of a general principle of law may follow as a result
of actions by nations to adopt these rules as domestic law. State practice leading to the evolution
of customary international law may result from international efforts of states to encourage all
states to enforce these rules against TNCs within their jurisdiction. See, e.g., J. BPJERLY, THE
LAW OF NATIONS 59-63 (6th ed. 1963); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
4-12, 14-20 (3d ed. 1979); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 170-76, 188-210. A more fluid policy-oriented perspective would find these authoritative statements of influential participants in the international system as creative of community policy that will guide international actors. See Reisman, InternationalLawmaking.A Process
of Communication, 75 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 101, 119-20 (1981). See generally M. McDouGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981).
These existing voluntary codes already influence TNC activities despite the absence of implementing treaties. Rubin, supra note 6, at 918, 920. The first successful test of the OECD Guidelines occurred in the Badger case. See Horn,supra note 6, at 931-32. Although the codes are not
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This treatment of TNCs is quite consistent with the traditional theory of public international law. According to that theory, the only subjects of international law are nation-states. All other entities,
particularly individuals and business organizations, interact with international law indirectly through their national governments.8 Many academicians and theorists disagree with these traditional premises; they
argue either that the premises have never been correct 9 or that the recent developments that have changed the international legal system
have made them n, longer correct. 10 Certainly, due to the increasing
legally enforceable, they often express the consensus of the member nations and, in so doing, they
might have legal effects and become part of public international law. Id at 936-37; R. WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT 21 (1980); Baade,

supra note 6, at 7, 9, 14 & n.57; Vogelaar, MuinationalEnterprisevThe Giddelinesin Practice, 86
OECD OBSERVER 7 (1977). See Fatourossupra note 6, at 951, 961-72; Horn, Codes of Conductfor
MultinationalEnterprisesandTranmnationalLex Mercatora.An InternationalProcessofLearning
and Law-Makin in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRiSES 45 (N. Horn ed. 1980); Stanley, supra note 6, at 977-78. For a survey of international

activities directed at TNCs that are likely to develop into new law, see Baade, supra note 2.
Some members of the business community have acknowledged the likelihood that these codes
will evolve into mandatory standards. Coombe, supra note 5, at 31. Organized labor has used
existing codes as tactical tools. Stanley, supra note 6, at 1002.
8. P. JEssup, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE THOMAS M. COOLEY LECTURES 20-21
(1959); T. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 330-32 (1899); H. WHEATrON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-74 (1936). See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS, A
STUDY OF WORLD SoCITY 131 (3d ed. 1964).

Many contemporary academicians agree that TNCs should interact with international law,
through nation-states and that nation-states should regulate TNCs. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES 2 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1981); Rubin, MultinationalEnterprise andNationalSovereignt. A Skeptic's Analysi, 3 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1,
14 (1971); Vagts, supra note 1,at 740-43.
9. McDougal and Leighton contend that the proposition that public international law deals
with relations among states is a "nineteenth century canard." McDougal & Leighton, The Rights
ofMan in the World Community: ConstitutionalIllusion Versus RationalAction, 59 YALE LJ.60,
74 (1949). Emphasis upon relations between states, to the exclusion of individuals, is, in fact, of
relatively recent origin, a product of nineteenth century positivism. 1 D. O'CoNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-11 (2d ed. 1970); C. OKEE, CONTROV SIL SUBECrs OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEW ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

THEIR TREATY-MAKNG CAPACITY 68-69 (1974); IdelsonA Law ofNationsandthe Individa, 30
GROTIUS Soc'y 50, 53-54 (1945); Lissitzyn, TerritorialEntities Other than IndependentStates in the
Law ofTreatier, 3 RECUEIL DES CoURs 5 (1968). Perhaps the oldest example of the applicability
of international law to a non-state is the Catholic Church. J. LADOR-LEDEtER, INTERNATIONAL
NON-GOvERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES 29 (1963).

10. See, eg., P. JESSUP,A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15-16 (1968); W. FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note I, at 162. Jessup argues that although the state was traditionally the sole subject of international law and the individual had to
rely on the state in international legal relations, this has substantially broken down and will continue to do so. See P. JESSUP,supra at 15-16; see also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES at 2 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1981); C. OKEKE, supra note 9,
at 2-3; Spofford, Third Party Judgment andInternationalEconomic Transactions,3 RECUEIL DES
Corms 116, 191 (1964).
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international importance of TNCs, international law either has or will
become relevant to their behavior.
B.

Why Change is Needed

The failure to allow direct TNC participation in the development
of potential international law imposes unnecessary costs on the international legal system. Because the proposed codes do not resolve the underlying political and economic issues, they merely convert these
controversies into legal issues. Failing to bring the major international
actors into this process does little to advance relevant interests and imposes unnecessary risks on the inherently frail international legal system. Expanding the role that TNCs and other major interest groups
play in the process of developing and implementing these rules might
be one way to avoid these negative results.
The hazards of making international rules for TNCs without their
direct participation are illustrated by the recent Deep Seabed negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III).II The exclusion of those TNCs involved in the deep
seabed mining industry from direct participation in these negotiations
forced them to rely on national governments for representation. Business representatives who wanted to participate in the negotiations had
to be associated with a government delegation. This severely limited
their participation. The result after over ten years of negotiation is an
accord that fails to fully reflect the reality of deep seabed mining. By
effectively excluding TNCs from the Deep Seabed negotiations, the international community limited its own access to relevant industry information, prevented many in the industry from developing an
understanding of the interests of the participating nations and the realities of the negotiations, and allowed the TNCs to avoid committing
themselves to the conference's compromises.' 2 These effects, in turn,
have given TNCs free rein to apply pressure to undermine the negotiaI

I1. For a comprehensive series of articles on the UNCLOS III negotiations, see Stevenson &
Oxman, The Preparationsforihe Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1(1974); The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of Ihe Sea: the 1974 CaracasSession, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. I
(1975);-he 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1975); and Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on Law of the Seax the 1976 New York Session, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247
(1977);---he 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978);-he Seventh Session (1978).
73 AM. J. IN'L L. I (1979);-he Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1980);-7he Ninth
Session (1980), 75 AM. 1. INT'L L. 211 (1981);-he Tenth Session (1981), 75 AM. J. INT.L L. 1

(1982).
12. There were, of course, private discussions between company representatives and national
governments. Presumably, informal understandings were reached on specific negotiating objectives to be undertaken by the state. They did not necessarily involve commitments of industry to
the international community on these matters.
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tions 13 and thereby to oppose their governments' adoption of the entire
Third Law of the Sea Convention. Thus, if UNCLOS III participants
wanted to develop an effective international agreement at an early date
they hurt their chances by excluding interested TNCs from direct
participation.
Precluding such TNC participation in the law-making process not
only impairs the opportunity to effectively implement the rules, it also
lessens the chances of maintaining their long-term viability. In theory,
then, participation by TNCs and other power groups would make this
rule-making process more realistic and its ultimate product more acceptable to all parties. In turn, the likelihood that the codes could be
successfully implemented would also increase. On the other hand, such
13. The most tangible result of TNC efforts to undermine the treaty has been the passage in
several countries of domestic legislation on deep seabed mining. On June 28, 1980, President
Carter signed into law the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. V
1981). France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics have all recently adopted their own deep seabed mining laws. See Act
of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I. [BGBL] 9080, No. 50, at
1457 (1980) (Federal Republic of Germany), 20 Itr'L L. MATEmALS 393 (March 1981); Act to
Amend the Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining of February 12, 1982, BGBL No. 5,
at 136 (1982), 21 INT'L L. MATERIALS 832 (1982); Deep Sea Mining Act (Temporary Provisions),
1981, (United Kingdom), 20 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1217 (1981); Edict on Provisional Measures to
Regulate Soviet Enterprises for the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources (April 17,
1982) (USSR),reprintedin Izvestia, Apr. 18, 1982 at 1, 21 INr'L L. MATERIALS 551 (1982); Law on
the Exploration and Exploitation of the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, Law No. 81-1135
of Dec. 23, 1981, 1981 Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise 3499 (France), 21 INT'L L.
MATERIALS 808 (1982); Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining (July 16, 1982), Enforcement of the Regulations for the Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining, Official
Register of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, No. 9770 (July 26, 1982).
On July 9, 1982, the United States announced that it would not sign the UNCLOS III Convention on the Law of the Sea. See New York Times, July 10, 1982, at 1, col. 2. The United
States refused to sign the treaty in part because a number of deep seabed mining consortia claimed
that they could not carry out commercial mining under the Treaty. See Hearingson U.S. Foreign
Policy and the Law of the Sea Before the House Foreign Affairs Comm, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 84
(1982) (statement of James L. Malone, Assistant Secretary of State for Ocean and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs). The few concessions that the United States offered in the
last round of talks, in March 1982, brought cries of "sellout" from representatives of the mining
industry. Some members of private industry lobbied actively in Washington against contemplated
proposals for accommodation and obtained a hearing at high levels in the White House. Ratiner,
The Law of/he Sea A Crossroadsfor American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006, 1013
(1982).
TNCs took an active role in shaping the United States legislation with respect to deep seabed
mining. See, e.g., Deep SeabedHardMineralResources Act: Hearingson HP 3350 Beore the
Comm on InternationalRelations and its Subcomn± on InternationalOrganizationsand InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-106 (1978) (statements of Marne A.
Dubs, Alfred P. Statham, Northcutt Ely, Esq., and Philip Hawkins); Deep SeabedHardMinerals
Act: Joint Hearingson S, 713 Bore the Comm on Commerce, Comm on ForeignRelations,and
the Comm on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-39 (1976) (statements of Northcutt Ely,
Esq., Jack Flipse, Marne A. Dubs, and C. G. Welling); See aso Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1977 at
1, col. 1.
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participation would raise a number of substantive and procedural issues, an example of which is the need to avoid giving undue leverage to
TNCs and other international actors vis-a-vis states and nongovernmental organizations. The purpose of this article is to explore these
issues from the perspective of public international legal theory and, to a
lesser extent, from pragmatic political and procedural points of view.
II. THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. InternationalLaw as Law.
Any examination of these issues must first consider the elementary
and fragile structure of the international legal system. It sits on the
fringes of those systems traditionally classified as systems of law' 4 and
is considered, at best, to be a rudimentary legal system that lacks the
basic elements identified by positivists and foind in all nation-state domestic legal systems.' 5 Despite the presence of a body of international
law, the international legal system's ability to procure conformance is
less than that found in the more advanced domestic legal systems. One
reason for this is that domestic legal systems benefit from the nationalism of their subjects. Not only does the international arena not benefit
from such national allegiance, it suffers because national sovereignty
encourages the subjects of international law to give that allegiance to
6
state interests rather than to those of the international community.1
Moreover, in the absence of a'single sovereign to issue commands, disseminate propaganda, or impose sanctions, no effective institution exists to encourage allegiance to international law. Finally, the absence
of a comprehensive system for a third-party determination of violations
provides greater opportunities for would-be violators to break the law
and for disputes to develop among its subjects. 17 Thus, without a soy14. . BRIERLY, suipra note 7, at 55-56; 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1940); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 222-25 (1961); H. MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONo
NATIONS: THEtSTRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 231-33, 236-37 (rev. 5th ed. 1978).
15. J.AUSTIN, THE PRoVrNCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 133-34, 201 (1954); 2 C.
WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO ScIENTIFIcA PERTRACTATUM 5-19 (J. Drake trans. 1934). See 2
C. BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTONUM Jupts PuBuci Lmju Duo 20-67 (T. Frank trans. 1930).
16. 1.CLAUDE,SwoRDs INTo PLOWSHARES 441-43 (2d ed. 1961). Many scholars have recognized the significance of loyalty to the effectiveness of law. H. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEMS
OF SOVEREIGNTY 16,272-73,274 (1919); R. WEST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY, Two
STUDIES: THE INTRUSION OF ORDER, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY 240-41 (1974). Laski stated:

"[Tihat state will be the stronger which thus binds to itself its members by the strength of a moral
purpose validated." H. LASKI, supra at 19. Others such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel pointed
to other factors as predominant. Id at 33; see W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, at 21, 246, 378.
17. West says: "Individual, group, or nation state, we cannot judge our own cause. And if
we try to do so we shall be reduced again and again to fighting for a supposed 'right' against a
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ereign to issue commands, a court system to determine violations, or a

police force to punish violators, international law is law only because
there are known norms of behavior that its subjects choose to follow in
most circumstances.
This structure of the international legal system has had a direct
impact on its substantive law. Because voluntary allegiance to its
norms is much more important to the international legal system than to
domestic systems, international law has maximized this allegiance by
placing great emphasis on describing the actual patterns of national
behavior as normative rules and by limiting its attempts to impose new
norms of behavior on the international community.' 8 Because the international community has traditionally been small and homogeneous,
the law it has generated has reflected its desires and interests.1 9 This
conclusion is accurate despite the recent, frequent changes in public
supposed 'wrong,' for one set of illusions against another." R. WEsT,supra note 15, at 240; see also
id at 250.
Schwarzenberger lauds the auto-enforcement of international law because it assures that the
system will be flexible enough to take into account changing power relationships. G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, SUpra note 8, at 199-201.
18. Dunn has pointed out the significance of the relationship of the community to the rules of
international law:.
The times in which international law has achieved its greatest successes have been those
in which it has been in obvious harmony with the system of values held by the most
important classes in the leading nations of the world. In the early days, international law
got a foothold because it incorporated the moral values of Christianity....
It likewise
managed to survive in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because it served directly
tha values held by the commercial and industrial classes ....
Dunn, The InternaionalRights of Individuals, 35 AM. SoC. IN'L L. 14, 17 (1941); see also C.
OKEKE, supra note 9, at 217; G. SCHwARzENBERO, supra note 8, at 30-31, 211, 274; McDougal,
supra note 1,at 183. Brierly wrote:
'The legal order,' as Professor Pound has recently written, 'must be flexible as well as
stable. It must be overhauled continually and refitted continually to the changes in the
actual life which it is to govern. If we seek principles, we must seek principles of change
no less than principles of stability' .... The suggestion may be hazarded that international law has in great part neglected one side of this twofold function; it has aimed at
stabilizing without sufficiently providing for the growth of international society; it has
attempted to maintain existing values, but rarely to create new ones.
J.BRIER.Y, supra note 7, at 72. From a broader perspective, Laski wrote:
The will of the State obtains pre-eminence over the wills of other groups exactly to the
point where it is interpreted with sufficient wisdom to obtain general acceptance, and no
further ....Should it venture into dangerous places it pays the penalty of its audacity ...There is no sanction for law other than the consent of the human mind. It is
sheer illusion to imagine that the authority of the State has any other safeguard than the
wills of its members.
L LAsIU, mpra note 15, at 14.
Waltz distinguishes between domestic and international political structures on the basis that

the domestic political structure is hierarchic and the structure of the international system is anar*
chic. K. WALTz,THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 114-15 (1979).
19. J.BRiERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAw 40-41 (1944); W. FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANoINO STRucTuRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 214-15, 278-79; G.
SCHWARZENBEROER, Myra note 8, at 206, 209.
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international law. The increasing prominence of treaties, general principles of law, and resolutions of international organizations continues
to make community consent to new international norms an important
element in the process of law development.
Of course, both the codification of customary international practice and the creation of new norms present risks to the international
legal system. Hans Kelsen identified two limitations on any legal system: the "superior" and "inferior" limits. The "superior limit" is
reached when the law conforms so completely to the behavior of its
subjects that it effectively disappears because it has no normative value.
At the "inferior limit," violations are so rampant that, again, lacking
any normative value, the law vanishes. 20 In the international legal system,.norms have traditionally approached the "superior limit." Nevertheless, current efforts to dramatically change these norms, particularly
in the economic arena, may push the system to the "inferior limit."
B. Nation-StatePreeminence.
The traditionally preeminent position of the nation-state has
played an important role in keeping the international legal system viable. From its inception, international law focused upon the sovereign
territorial entity, giving natural persons and other entities a peripheral
role. 21 The birth of modern international law at the signing of the
20. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 120 (1945); H. KEsEN, ALLOEMEINE

STAATSIEHRE 18-19 (1925). Marek describes Kelsen's position as follows:

To the obvious question concerning the actual extent of that necessary margin of lawbreaking, Kelsen replies with the theory of the "superior" and "inferior" limit. Should a

legal system not be observed at all, or be observed only to an insignificant degree, then

the "inferior limit" of effectiveness would be passed: there would in fact be no more law.

But it would meet with exactly the same fate in the case of its total and absolute observance; should legal norms entirely correspond to existing reality to the extent of excluding the possibility of their violation, then the "superior limit" would be passed: the
normative character of the law would disappear in favor of causality, and law itself with

it .... It is not the existence of illegal acts which forms the supreme challenge to
international law, but the possibility of their giving rise to legal titles on equal footing
with lawful acts.

K. MAREK,IDEAITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 554 (2d ed.

1968).
21. In the Greek city-state system, it was very important that new colonies be duly constituted by the proper procedures. 2 C. PHILLISON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 117-18 (1911). The rules and principles of war applied only to
civilized sovereign states. Id at 195. Supreme allegiance was expected to be directed to the state,
1 id at 42; 2 id at 91. The right to send ambassadors was a right inherent only in sovereign
powers. 1 id at 309. The same was true in Roman times. l id at 101-11, 379. This was particularly true with respect to the Barbarians who were not given the same status as free states. l id at
230-31; 2 id at 195-96; see also P. POTTER, THIS WORLD OF NATIONS, FOUNDATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 22 (1929).

During medieval times this distinction between natural persons and the sovereign territorial
entity appears to have broken down through the development of the concept of relative sover-
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Treaty of Westphalia was the product of a power struggle pitting the
nascent state system against the Church and the Holy Roman Emperor. 22 Public international law was developed in order to legitimate
and support the new system.23 Since that time, national governments
have held most of the political, economic, and military power, thereby
making them the natural foci of international law. 24
In the Twentieth Century, particularly after World War II, the nation-state's fallibility has become increasingly apparent. Indeed, the
role of intergovernmental organizations in international affairs has expanded substantially as a result of the international community's need
to attain the goals that nation-states could not reach alone.2 5 Such oreignty; various semi-sovereigns were accorded status as individuals. G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 8, at 86-87.
22. Brierly wrote:
mhe fundamental rights of states were born of the needs of a cause, rather than of
reflection on the nature of the juridical relations of states. They were invented because
the post-Renaissance prince, himself a successful rebel against claims of pope and emperor, sought in a new juridical order a system to consecrate his hard won independence.
The new political order... had to be justified and so strengthened by a theory which
would show that it and it alone was consistent with a rightly ordered universe.
J. BRiERLY, supra note 19, at 4-5; see also id at 30-31; W. FREDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 4,20-21. For a history of these developments, see

T. WALKER, supra note 8, at 64, 67-68, 84, 90, 125-27, 141-43, 146, 150-52, 203; see also J.
BIUERL.Y, SU'pra note 19, at 3; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 101. Contra C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (P. Corbett trans. 1968). In De

Visscher's opinion, to date public international law from the establishment of the nation-state, i.e.,
the Treaty of Westphalia, is to tie public international law to its subjects-equal sovereign states.
He argues that the establishment of the nation-state was merely a redistribution of power.
23. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 7.
24. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at

21, 213-14 (1964). Schwarzenberger goes so far as to say that there are only two world powers
today-the United States and the U.S.S.R. According to Schwarzenberger, France, the United
Kingdom, and China are major powers with only regional significance. G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 8, at 118-20. He states that the smaller powers can only survive under the umbrella of
the more powerful states. Id at 102-08. Even the Catholic Church is subservient to the nationstate. Id at 131.
In contrast, Galtung views even the nonterritorial actors as becoming the foci of decisionmaking in world affairs. Galtung, WonterritorialActors and the Problem of Peace, in ON THE
CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER 151 (S. Mendlovitz ed. 1975). Timberg, in his well-regarded

article, InternationalCombines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 575 (1947), takes a
similar view, arguing that international combines (TNCs) have wrested the essence of sovereignty
from the nation-state. Id at 578.
25. Support can be found for the premise that the nation-state system is poorly equipped to
handle the current changes in the international sphere. See J. LADOR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at
379; H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 80
(1927); C. OKEKE, supra note 9, at 68; Friedmann, The ChangingDimensionsof InternationalLaw,
62 COLUM. L. REV. 1146, 1156 (1962). Laski wrote in 1932 that the sovereign nation-state was a
creation to meet the world of the nineteenth century and is ill-suited for the twentieth century with
changes wrought by modem science and economic interdependence. H. LASKI, NATIONALISM
AND THE FUTURE OF CIVILIZATION 26 (1932); see also id at 54. Perhaps the strongest modern
advocate for the demise of the nation-state system is Richard Falk, who calls for a system of
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ganizations have even been accorded formal international legal personality for certain purposes. 26 While these entities are still largely
controlled by nation-states, they also have international significance as
separate corporate bodies. 27
To a substantially lesser degree, the international roles of natural
persons, nongovernmental organizations, and TNCs have also been
nonterritorial central guidance because "[tihe interaction of territorial sovereign states is increasingly at variance with thefunctionallogic of planning, guidance and budgeting that are needed for
a planet that has less and less surplus capacity and is more often faced with the realities of scarcity." Falk, The Future of World Order, in Jus ET SociETAs, ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO WOLFGANG
FRmDMANN 38, 57 (G. Wilner ed. 1979); see also J. SCHNEIDER, TREATY-MAKING POWER OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 141-42 (1959).
Feld lists six nongovernmental entities having international impact today: multinational enterprises; labor organizations; nongovernmental organizations established to pursue transnational

objectives; nongovernmental organizations established as political parties; guerilla and liberation
organizations; and large foundations. W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITics, A STUDY OF BuSINESs, LABOR, AND PoImcAI. Gaoups 4-6 (1972); see also Id at 3, 148.
Jessup has defined the international community as follows: "The 'international community'
should now be used as a term descriptive of a large number of political entities enjoying varying
degrees of political independence and of economic self-sufficiency, plus various collectivities or

organizations in which those entities are grouped for certain purposes." P. JEssup, supra note 8, at
24; see also id at 21; McDougal, supra note 1, at 174.
26. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 1949 I.C.J. 174;
W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218-19 (1964); C. OKEKE,
supra note 9, at 181-216. There are a number of theories used to explain the origins of the international legal personality of international organizations. These include: 1) personality expressly or
impliedly conferred by the agreement of the states that created the organization; 2) personality
derived from the voting structure, composition and powers of the organization; 3) personality
derived from specific rights and duties of the international organization which necessarily provide
for international legal personality; 4) personality derived from inherent legal personality based on
the existence of the international organization and general international law. See Id at 183-84.
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the international legal personality of international organizations has been the virtual explosion of the number of treaties entered into by international
organizations since 1945. See id at 192; see also First Report on the Question of Treaties Concluded between States and International Organizations or Between Two or More International
Organizations, Report of Professor Reuter, Special Rapporteur, made at the 24th Session of the
International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/258 1972; S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIEs, A GUIDE iP TH LEoISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 44 (1970). The international legal personality of international organizations, however, is broader than that of mere
treaty-making power. See D. BOWETr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTONS 299-308, 323,
353-54 (3d ed. 1975). International organizations have an expanding role to play in the development of international legal norms. See id at 308-09. The Soviets, however, have been more
reticent about the international legal personality of international organizations and particularly
their role in developing new norms of international law. See G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 327-36 (W. Butler trans. 1974); C. Oi, nKE, supra note 9, at 185-88.

27. See supra note 26; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 219, at 81 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); see also Galtung, supra note 24, at 158;
GRIEvES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 8-9 (1969); McNemar, The
FutureRole ofInternationallnstitutions,in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
448-49, 459-62 (1972). See generally W. FELD, supra note 25, at 3.
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recognized. 28 However, the reluctance of nation-states to accept their
28. As to individuals,

see

RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

THE UNITED STATES § 101, at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980); H. WHEATON, sTpra note 8, at 26-27;
McDougal & Leighton supra note 9, at 83-84. C. NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962), reviews the areas where individuals interact directly with international law and procedure. Norgaard finds areas where individuals are only the subjects of duties
or rights and others where they also have a procedural duty or right. These procedural rights and
duties of individuals are, however, limited in number and in kind. He considers the right of
petition under set procedures to be a procedural qualification. See Id at 82-303; see also P. JEssup, supra note 10, at 17-18; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-114 (1952); IL
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 38 (1950). Individuals have been
given the right to appear before international tribunals. See id at 18, 32; W. FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40,241 (1964); S. KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER S.ESLA 78 (1942). International organizations have been afforded personality for some purposes. Rama-Montaldo, InternationalLegal Personality and
Implied Powers ofInternationalOrganizations,.1970 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 123; 1949 LC.J. 174;
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §219, at I
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); H. WHEATON, supra note 8, at 26-27; McDougal & Leighton, supra note
9, at 83-84.
It has been suggested that the role of individuals in international law be expanded. See J.
BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 52-53; P. JESSUP, supra note 10, at 121; McDougal, supra note 1, at 16162, Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of Statesfor Injiv'es to the Economic InterestsofAliens, 55 AM.
J. INTr'L L. 545, 578 (1961); Spofford, supra note 10. In natural law theory the-individual is the
only subject of law. See McDougal & Leighton, supra note 9, at 83. There are also those who
have argued that individuals are not subjects of international law either because they could not be
as a matter of doctrine or because they had not satisfied the dual test which requires them to
possess rights or duties under substantive law and to participate in the procedural enforcement
system. See the authors referred to in C. NORGAARD, supra, at 35-41.
For a full review of the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGO) on the international plane as of 1963, see J. LADOR-LEDERER., supra note 9; see ao W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WoRLD POLITICS, supra note 25, at 175-76, 235. National liberation groups and
other state-preparing NGOs have also been accorded some international legal personality. See .
LADoR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at 117-18, 123, 141; C. OKPItE, supra note 9, at 109-27. Observer
status at the U.N. has been granted to African national liberation movements recognized by the
Organization of African Unity. See G.A. Res. 3280, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 31/30,31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 118, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1976). Such observer status has also been granted to the Palestine Liberation Organization. G.A.
Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See Kassim, The
PalestineLiberation Organization's Claim to Statu" A JuridicalAnalysisunderInternationalLaw,
9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1980). Under Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations hundreds of NGOs enjoy consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. The same has
been true for exiled or refugee governments many of which obtain legal personality. See H. BLIX,
TREATY MAXING POWER 187 (1960); W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD PoLITIcs, supra note 25, at 230-33; H. KELSEN, supra note 20, at 288-89. Component states of federal
unions have also had certain international legal personality. Lissitzyn, supra note 9, at 25; see C.
OKEKE, spra note 9, at 43-62.
Feld argues that "[b]y being able to induce value-allocating action and reaction of governments and [intergovernmental organizations] in international system[s], nongovernmental entities
clearly deserve actor status, but this status is qualitatively different for those of national governments, since they cannot 'authoritatively' allocate values but depend on governments for this." W.
FELD, supra note 25, at 247-48. Of course, Timberg, supra note 24, disagrees with this characterization of the limited power of non-governmental entities.
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participation has limited it to very few areas. 29 Regardless of the degree of participation, these developments have made it clear that there

is no systemic reason why non-state entities may not participate in the
international legal system. 30
III.

THE PARTICIPATION OF

TNCs

IN THE PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

A.

Current Perspectives on TNC Partie0atio

There is evidence that TNCs have had international legal personality and have participated in the international legal system for some
time.31 Examples of such participation include application of public
international law to contracts with state entities32 and participation in
29. W. FRIEDMANN, The Changing Structure oflnternationalLaw,supra note 1, at 234-35; G.
SCHWARZENBERGER,

supra note 8, at 136-37.

30. "Gradually a consensus of opinion is evolving to the effect that although it is States which
are the normal subjects of international law, there is nothing in international law which is fundamentally opposed to individuals and other legal persons becoming subjects of international rights
and duties, i.e., subjects of international law." H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 25, at 79; accord
France v. United States of America, 1952 I.CJ. 176; E. NWOGUGu, LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR INv nsr iEs INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30, 249-50 (1965); C. OXEKE, supra note 9, at 220, Dunn,
supra note 18, at 18. Member states of federal states may also have international legal personality
for some purposes. 1 OPPENHEM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 167-68 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed.
1948).
In theory, the communist view is that states are not subjects of international law and that the
true subjects are the workers. Of course, the Soviet Union has substantially compromised its
position on the matter. W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 328-29; J. LADOR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at 168; C. OKEKE, supra note 9, at 16.
Although all subjects of international law are theoretically equal, the state subjects of international law do not possess equal capacity. Thus, it is no great step to add non-states as subjects of
that law. B. BROMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY OF STATES AS APPLIED IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGAi.zATIONs 21-74, 117 (1959); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 31-32. Jessup has argued strongly for a change in the doctrine of
equality of states. P. JEssuP, supra note 8, at 24; P. JEssuP, supra note 10, at 27-28.
31. P. JESSUP, supra note 1, at 3; Miller, he Global CorporationandAmerican Constitutionalbm" Some PoliticalConsequencesof Economic Power, 6 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 235, 238-39 (1971);
see also W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1. at
174-75, 375; Glizer, A FunctionalApproach to the InternationalFinanceCorporation, 57 COLUM.
L. REv. 1089 (1957); Mann, The ProperLaw of ContractsConcludedby InternationalPersons, 1959
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34. Corporations established by groups of states, such as Eurofima,
Eurochemic, the Mont Blanc Tunnel Company, and the Mozelle Canal Company have participated in the international legal system. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 1, at 183; W. FRIEDMANN,
supra note 25, at 1159-60. In addition the Dutch East India Company and the British East India
Company historically acted as if they were international legal persons. They "had the power to
make war and peace and to conclude treaties on which their states relied as basis of rights." P.
JEssUP, supra note 10, at 22. The Hudson Bay Company's activities in North America are discussed in Katz, The Company that Rules the North, GEo II (June 1981).
32. See The Lena Goldfields Arbitration, 1929-30 ANN. DIo. PuB. INT'L L. CASES (Nos. 1,
258) (H. Lauterpacht ed.); P. JESSUP, supra note 10, at 33, 139-40; 1 G. SCHWARZENBERoER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (1945); Mann, supra note 31, at 21, 43; McNair, The GeneralPrincolesof
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dispute settlement forums established either by treaty or intergovernmental organizations. 33 Some principles of public international law
have become so widely accepted that they have been viewed as binding
on the TNCs' international activities. 34 Finally, TNCs advise international organizations when their interests are at stak& 5 and it is clear
Law Recognized by CivilizedNations, 1957 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1; The Abu Dhabi Arbitration, 1
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247-51 (1952). On the other hand, the Permanent Court of International
Justice stated in the Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.IJ. Ser. A. Nos. 20/21, at 41, that "[a]ny
contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of internal law is based
on the municipal law of some country." Mann, supra note 3 1, at 47-48, argues that there has been
a progressive development of international law since the Serbian Loans decision.
33. See The Lena Goldfields Arbitration, supra note-32; H. CATrAN, THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 143 (1967); J. LADoR-LEDERER, Supra note
9, at 355-56, 370; C. OKEKE, supra note 9, at 211-12; Spofford, supra note 10, at 177-81 (a review of
situations in which non-state entities have had'access by treaty to international adjudications often
against nation-states).
Both the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community
have provisions in their charters which in effect grant standing in their dispute-settlement tribunals to private corporations. See Treaty of the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
art. 173,298 U.N.T.S. 11; 2 Common Market Rep. [CCH] 4636.03 1976; Treaty of the European
Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, arts. 33, 48, 261 U.N.T.S. 143; W. FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 224-25, 375; E. NwoGuGu,
supra note 30, at 240. The UNCTRAL Rules on International Commercial Arbitration, 1967
Y.B. Int'l Trade L. 157 (United Nations), were developed for this purpose. See Tunc, The Need
for Universal UniFcationofthe Law of InternationalSales, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND
TRADE LAW 127 (C. Schmitthoff & K. Simmonds eds. 1976).
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes was established specifically for the purpose of resolving investment disputes between industrial organizations and states.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprintedin 4 Ir'L L. MATERIALS
532 (1965); Amerasinghe, The InternationalCentreforSettlement ofInvestment Disptesand Development Through the Multinational Corporation, 9 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 793 (1976).
34. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, at
181-82. Spofford, supra note 10, at 207-09, argues that "[tihe principlepactasunt servanda which
had its first application as a rule governing princes in their diplomatic relations is thus now a
maxim of the international market place of the greatest consequence to [those] engaged in economic transactions." Many commercial contracts specify public international law as the source of
law that governs the contract. Mann, supra note 31, at 48-52.
35. See, e.g., Summary of Hearings Before the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N. Doc. No. ST/ESA/15 (1954). In 1972, Congress
approved legislation enabling Advisory Committees to be created by statute, the President, or an
agency, in order to provide means of collecting expert opinion and ideas for officers and agencies
in the executive branch. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, §§ 2, 3, 9(a),
86 Stat. 770, 770, 773-74 (1972). Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute or Presidential
directive, advisory committees are to be used solely for advisory purposes. See id § 9(b), 86 Stat.
at 774. Executives of TNCs have often served on such advisory committees, e.g., the Law of the
Sea Advisory Committee and the advisory committee for the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations. See supra note 4.
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that they play a direct36role in influencing national behavior on relevant
international matters.
Some commentators have suggested ignoring the fiction of "juridical actors." They argue that since the real actors are those natural per37
sons who have both a stake in and the power to affect the decisions, it
is immaterial what fictional entity has formal international personality.
On the basis of this analysis, many TNCs, or at least their leaders, have
always been and will continue to be participants in the international
legal system.
While this view is helpful in some cases, it is often necessary to
distinguish the personalities of organizations such as TNCs and state
entities from those of their human representatives and constituents. Because TNCs are corporate personalities and have substantial power at
their disposal, decisions about whether they should participate in the
law-making process and be held accountable for violations of the law
are significant. For example, the TNC's influence upon and accountability to rules of international law appear to be a function of the extent
to which it may directly participate in the international legal process.3 8
36. See Ray, CorporationsandAmerican ForeignRelations, 403 ANNALS 80, 86-91 (1972).
37. See H. KELSEN,supra note 20, at 97-98, 342-43; J. LADOR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at 21.
Kelsen stated.
The State, as a subject of international law, is in fact simply a juristic person.... Thus
when international law obligates and authorizes States ... it means that international
law obligates and authorizes those human individuals who are State organs. But international law regulates the behavior of these individuals indirectly, through the medium
When international law imposes upon a State [an]
of the national legal order ....
obligation... it is determined only what ought to be done in the name of one State and
what may be done in the name of the other;, but it is not determined who... has to
fulfill the obligation stipulated by international law.
H. KELSEN, supra note 20, at 342-43; see Duguit, Traite de Droit Constitutionnel 319 (2d ed.
1921); W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS. supra note 1, at 9; H.
KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE 243 (1922); C. NORGAARD,.rUpra note 28, at 72-77; G.
SCELLE, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 509-12 (3d ed. 1948); Dunn, supra note 18,
at 15; McDougal, supra note 1, at 161-62, 174-80; McDougal & Leighton, supra note 9, at 82-83.
C. OKEKE, supra note 9, at 17 observes:
Even... the founders of modern international law such as Vitoria, Suarez and Grotius
proceeded... upon the hypothesis that "the individual is the ultimate unit of all
law, international and municipal. in the double sense that the obligations of international law are ultimately addressed to him and that the development, the well-being and
the dignity of the individual human being are a matter of direct concern to international
law."
Id (quoting Lauterpacht, The Grolian Tradition in InternationalLaw, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
27).
38. J. BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 50.
The group dynamics of organizations create their own behavioral patterns among human
participants. See infra note 60. Consequently, the juridical entity often acquires a personality that
is distinct from the participating individuals. Thus if TNCs are going to have their interests faithfully represented, TNCs ought to be recognized as distinct entities within a legal system.
There are practical differences between direct participation in a legal system and indirect
participation via an intermediary, such as a national government. Part of the difference lies in
imperfections in the communication process. Thus, the nation-state may dilute legal commands
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In an effort to limit that influence, states continue to regard the nationstate government as the main (if not sole) participant in the international legal system and to exclude, or at least to severely limit, the nonstate entities' role. 39 This resistance to TNC participation is motivated
not merely by a nostalgic desire to return to the days when the state
was "sovereign," but by the nation-states' belief that a power struggle is
taking place between themselves and the TNCs.40 It is well-documented that there are a number of TNCs that are economically more
powerful than all but the largest nation-states. 41 Furthermore, the
nonterritorial and globe-circling activities of these TNCs make them
less subject to the will of individual nation-states and enable them to
play states off against each other. TNC involvement, particularly with
applicable to the TNC and may likewise altel the desires of the TNC when communicating withthe international community. The international system is particularly susceptible to these imperfections in communication because of the amorphous structure of the international legal system,
the complex interests of nation-state governments, and the relations between nation-state governments and TNCs. A second practical difference between direct and indirect participation is the
clement of commitment to the rules. As is pointed out inra at note 74 and accompanying text,
direct participation usually breeds commitment; exclusion usually does not.
39. The exceptional case of the ILO was primarily the result of extreme pressure placed on
western, developed governments by the labor union movement and advancing socialist politics. It
was thought that the creation of the tripartite system to develop international labor legislation
would deflect the pressures on national governments. Beguin, supra note 3, at 407-08.
40. W. FRIEDsANN, supra note 1, at 21, 366; see Baade, supra note 6, at 4; Falk, supra note
25, at 41-47; Fatouros, supra note 6, at 947. Rubin believes the nation-states' fears are ill-founded,
being based only on statistical evidence of TNC power. Rubin, supra note I, at 475. Certainly,
many believe that it is desirable and appropriate to use the International Legal System in the
struggle between the state and the INC. For example, Marxism recognizes that a primary function of law is its use as a tool in the struggle between classes. K. MARX, GRUNDRISSE 96, 769-70
(1%9). The positions of the third world and socialist countries at the code negotiations often
reflect these policies.
41. A chart in "The Multinational Corporation and the World Economy" prepared by the
Senate Committee on Finance found that of all nation-states and corporations, the largest 99
economic entities included 40 corporations. See MultinationalCorporations: HearingsBefore the
Subcomn on InternationalTrade of the Senate Comm on Finance, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 393
appA, 404 (1973). General Motors was the largest corporation, placing 23rd on the list. See ld
Two similar earlier studies were the War/Peace Report (Oct. 1968) and Arosala & Vayrynen at
the Tampere Peace Research Institute. dircussedin Galtung, supra note 24, at 162-63. Timbergsupra note 24, at 578, argued that the biggest private corporations have "to a large extent, wrested"
the substance of sovereignty from the so-called sovereign state." W. Feld, in NONGOVERNMENTAL
FoRcES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 4, found that TNCs "often possess considerably
greater material resources than many nation-states which enable them under certain conditions to
exert more powerful influences in the international sphere than the governments of many middlesized and small states." Afler comparing General Motors to Switzerland, he observed:
"[a]lthough the power of states rests on other elements than productive capacities and financial
resources inasmuch as military prowess as well as political assets and skills make up a significant
part of a country's overall capabilitie in the international arena, the figures given demonstrate the
potential power ofMNEs in world affairs." Id;seealso W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRucTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 28, 222; Rubin, supra note 6, at 915; Vagts, supra
note 1, at 747-51.
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third world governments, has often resulted in substantial TNC influence on host governments, 42 and that influence has not always served
those governments' best interests.

Some maintain that TNC activities are actually just a new form of
western colonialism 43 while others view the TNC as a more benign
force that is ultimately subject to state control even without major new
international initiatives. 44 Regardless of which view is correct, the intemational community is moving toward greater international regulation of international business 45 without allowing direct business
participation.
Currently, TNC directors appear to agree with many national governments that TNCs ought not to participate directly in the international legal system-a position evidenced by the fact that TNCs have
not overtly sought broad international legal personality. In fact, when
George Ball proposed that the major TNCs should be subject to international rather than national incorporation, the business community
42. See J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1970);
cf. D. GOULET, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE-VALUE CONFLICTS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 200-04
(1977); H. Perlmutter,Attitudinal Patter in Joint DecisionMaking in MultinationalFirms-Nation
State Relationships, in INTERNATIONAL DECISION MAKING 201, 218-19 (M. Tuite, R. Chisholm &
M. Radnor eds. 1972); Vagts, supra note 1, at 756-76; Waltz, The Myth of Interdependence, aid
Vernon, Future of the MultinationalEnterprise, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 205, 373,
389-400 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970). The events that led up to American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), exemplify the impact that TNC power can have on weak states. In

the third world, TNCs have attracted labor unions and in so doing angered ruling national elites.
See W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLmcs, supra note 1, at 5, 156-57,

165. As nations have recognized this problem, they have attempted to resist the TNC influence.
It is possible that TNC influence in domestic affairs of developing countries will decline. See
W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 228-29:
Nye, Two Views of World Order, in GLOBAL COMPANIES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD

BUSINESS, 165-66 (G. Ball ed. 1975). With their limited power, TNCs are sometimes able to affect
government decisions, but such behavior presents risks to TNCs. See Rubin, supra note 1,at 478.
43. See L. SOLOMON, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER
4 (1978); THE NATION-STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT xli (J. Gun-

nemann ed. 1975). The leaders of the major TNCs come from the western developed countries
and often reflect the interests and biases of their native lands even in their business decisions.
Theoretically, th6 government of the country in which the TNC is incorporated or the government
of the country to which the leadership owes its nationality could dictate the behavior of the TNC
and its leaders. See W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1,

at 23, 92-94, 99; Rubin, supra note 1, at 477-78.
Other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present a similar risk particularly to the third
world. Their activities appear to benefit a group of small, highly-developed nations that have
taken a particular interest in NGOs. See W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD
'POLITICS, supra note I, at 182-86, 196; of id at 16-17; J. LADoR-LEDERER, sTpra note 9, at 378;

Galtung,supra note 24, at 165. The United States' and other developed nations' policy of interdependence often enhances TNC power vis-a-vis developing countries. Cf. W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note I at 16-17.

44. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 14; Rubin, supra note 1, at 475, 478.
45. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 479-87; Rubin, supra note 6, at 914.
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was unenthusiastic.46 As one might expect, such a response was a function of the nation-states' fear of power loss and the business leaders'
resistance to change.
TNCs benefit from their international nonstatus. Nonstatus immunizes them from direct accountability to international legal norms
and permits them to use sympathetic national governments to parry
outside efforts to mold their behavior. TNCs also enjoy some immunity from third world derision at the U.N. General Assembly and other
multinational forums because national governments are willing to insulate them from these and other international pressures. Broad international legal personality would destroy these defenses. On the other
hand, TNCs are eager to influence international decision making. They
are willing participants to the extent that they can obtain specjic international legal personality without loss of the benefits that the lack of
it will become increasgeneral personality provides. 47 In the future,
48
ways.
both
it
have
to
them
for
difficult
ingly
46. In addition to the TNC's lack of interest, other groups such as academia and interest
groups were similarly unenthusiastic. Proposalsforan InternaionalCharter, in GLOBAL COMPANIES,Unpra note 42, at 170-71. But see Business Opinion, One Shce of the PRe, TimE,Nov. 24, 1967,
at 95. Bal's proposal is criticized in Rubin, supra note 8, at 33-34.
47. An example is many TNCs' desire to obtain standing to bring legal claims before the
dispute settlement systems to be established within the context of the deep seabed regime of the
Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. See Article 187, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982).
48. Regardless of the reasons, TNC interests often conflict with the apparent interests of nation-states, and nation-states acting alone are often incapable of controlling the TNCs. See R.
BARNETT & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974); R. VERNON, SOVEREiGNTY AT BAY 3, 230, 249
(1971); D. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL REOULATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIoNs (1976);
Baade,supra note 2, at 409, Fatourossupra note 6, at 951; Rubin, supra note 8, at 30-31; Timberg,
supra note 24 at 576. The conflict is particularly apparent in developing countries. See W. FELD,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND UN POLITICS, supra note I, at 1-2, 6-15; The Impact of
Multinational Corporations on the Development Process and on International Relations, Report
of the Group of Eminent Persns to Study the Role of Multinational Corporations in Development and in International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Add. 1 (1974); Vagts, supra note 1, at
756-58, 776-88; Goldberg & Kindleberger, Towarda GAT Tfor Investment: A ProposalforSupervi-.
sion of the InternattonalCorporation,2 LAW & PoL. INTL Bus. 295, 296 (1970).
Christopher Layne makes a strong argument for the opposite conclusion. See Layne, The
Multinational Enterprise in the InternationalPolitical Systen A Theoretical Consideration, 13
N.Y.U. J.INT'L LAW & PoL. 27 (1980). He claims that the anarchical structure of the international political system makes it necessary for nation-states to act only in their self-interest and that
they will always dominate the behavior of TNCs. See id at 46, 53-55, 58. It is indisputable that
under the present system nation-states must act in their self-interest and will attempt to turn
TNCs' behavior to their benefit. But TNCs have transnational mobility not shared by nationstates and their economic interests often diverge from the theoretical interests of particular nationstates. "The most honest corporate manager acting rationally within a transnational perspective is
bound to have conflicts of interest with the most reasonable of statesmen whose rationality (and
democratic responsibility) is bounded by national frontiers." Nye. supra note 42, at 165. As a:
consequence, the TNC will inevitably utilize its mobility and economic power to selectively mold
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CurrentArguments For andAgainst TNC Participation.

There are strong arguments for expanding the role of TNCs in the
international legal system. Nation-states aside, TNCs are the most
powerful actors in the world today and to not recognize that power
would be unrealistic. 49 The international economy depends heavily on
the services they provide and they have far greater influence and eco-

nomic power than unorganized human beings50 or most other nongovnational behavior to reflect TNC interests or to avoid particular nation-state efforts to regulate
TNC behavior.
Thus, the TNC represents a new dimension in international politics. The desire to regain
control over international decision-making motivates many states, rich and poor, to establish
norms of behavior that directly or indirectly limit a TNC's ability to play nation-states against
each other. In turn, TNCs have an interest in the development of uniform international rules that
would discourage nation-states from expropriating TNC property. They also have an interest 1h
establishing rules of uniform treatment that would reduce the cost and difficulty of maintaining
transnational operations. Rostow has argued that there is a need for international coordination on
such subjects as provision of remedies for fraud, supervision of the Euromarket and other unregulated pools of fraud, control of monopolies and restrictive business practices, and transfer of technology and know-how. See Rostow, "heNeedfor Treaty, in GLOBAL COMPANiES, supra note 42,
at 158. Consequently, nation-states and TNCs alike have an interest in creating some international norms to govern TNC interaction with nation-states.
Governments of the largest western, developed states, although sympathetic toward many of
the TNCs' economic objectives, nevertheless continue to favor state domination of the international legal process. The United States' guidelines for private sector representatives on U.S. delegations to international negotiations illustrate the United States' preference for continued state
domination of the international legal process:
No government official shall permit private sector representatives to speak for the U.S.
Government at any meeting with foreign government officials. However, the head of
delegation may authorize a private sector representative to explain a technical or factual
point, if,
in the judgment of the head of delegation, (I) this will advance U.S. objectives
at the conference or negotiation; and (2) the private sector representative is best able to
speak on the point under discussion.
Participation of Private Sector Representatives on U.S. Delegations, Final Guidelines, 44 Fed,
Reg. 17,846, 17,848 (1979). See R. BARNETT & R. MULLER, supra, at 75-77; K. MARX,GRUNDRISSE 96, 769-70 (1969). G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 202, observes that customary

international law serves the function of maintaining the aristocracy of states by excluding nonstates. He sees public international law as a method of applying refined pressure on society in
order to legitimatize the power relationship. Id at 199-200, 229. Codes regulating TNCs may
also be regarded(as the means by which nation-states retain controL Baade, supra note 6, at 4;
Fatouros, supra note 6, at 947; Stanley, supra note 6, at 986-93.
49. Vagts, supra note 1;see W. FRiEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRucruRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note l,at 374-75; Rubin, supra note 6, at 915; Rubin, supra note 1, at 475.

Layne takes the contrary view, that the TNC is not an international actor because it is ultimately
subject to the control of the nation-state. See Layne, supra note 48.
50. Friedmann, supra note 25, at 1156, observed.
In international law the differences between the individual and the private corporation
are fundamental. The former is one of several thousand million persons, subject to the
authority and control of a state and of economic, social, or political groupings of a national or international character. The latter is a collectivity that, in terms of economic,
organizational, and political power, often surpasses many of the smaller states.
.See a/o Sabine & Shepard,,Introductionto H. KRABBE, supra note 37, at XLIL; see also Maitland,
Introduction to 0. GIERKE, POLMCAL THEoaiEs OF THE MIDDLE AGE (1900).
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ernmental organizations. 51 In fact, even the influence of
intergovernmental organizations, which depends on the continued
financial and political support of nation-state sponsors, cannot be compared to the power of many TNCs. 5 2 This argument for increased

TNC participation is further supported by the conclusion, reached earlier in this article, that the continued viability of the international legal
system depends upon the close conformity of public international law
to international realities.5 3
Of course, some TNCs act on the international plane more than others. See W.

FUEDmANN,

THE CHANGING SaUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 233; McDougal, supra note

1,at 249. Many TNCs deserve only ad hoc personality rather than broad status comparable to
international organizations. See W. FRIEDmANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 223; McDougal, supra note 1, at 249-53.
51. Although non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do succeed in bringing about some
global changes, such changes are usually undiamatic, diffuse, and slow. See W. FELD, NONCOVERNMENTAL FoRcEs AND WORLD POLmCS, supra note 1, at 208-09. Quantitative figures that
might measure the significance and influence of NGOs do not adequately describe NGOs' impact
on intergovernmental organizations. See id at 187-91, 196, 201, 204-07, 214, 227-29.
McDougal, on the other hand, considers transnational pressure groups and political parties to
be effective participants in the world power process, with enormous potential for influencing international decisions. See McDougal, stpranote 1,at 237-44. The larger philanthropic foundations
may wield equivalent power. See Bell, The FordFoundation as a TransationalActor, 25 INTL
OiO. 465 (1971); see also C. OKEE, supra note 9, at 206 (International Committee of the Red
Cross and the World Council of Churches).
52. See Emerson & Claude, The Soiet Unionandthe UnitedNations: An Essay in Interpretaion, 6 INT'L ORG. 1 (1952); Rothwell, InternationalOrganizationsand World Politics, 3 INT'.
ORG. 605 (1949); Sohn, The Impact ofthe UnitedNations on InternationalLaw, 46 AM. Soc. INT'L
L. 104 (1949). But see McDougal, supra note 1, at 228. One Soviet scholar thinks the role of
international organizations should be restricted to the desires of the sponsoring nations. See G.
TuNKiN, supra note 26, at 357, 362. Meron, in THE UNrrED NATIONS SECRETARIAT: THE RULES
AND PRACTICE (1977), reveals the tension between theoretical autonomy of the United Nations
organization and the actual political pressures brought to bear by member governments.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 13-30.
The evolution of international law has been overwhelmingly dependent upon the progressive adoption and modification of rules in response to changed international conditions .. . [i]f, as is an indubitable fact of modem international practice, corporations
play an increasingly important and frequent part in international transactions to which
states are parties, it is for the science of international law to interpret this phenomenon
against the broader background of modem international economic activities.
Friedmann, spra note 25, at 1155-56.
Lauterpacht contends that the definition of international legal personality has dramatically
expanded to include international organizations and individuals because international law has
expanded beyond issues of viar. For international law to stay viable, the personality of its subjects
has had to expand; this, in turn, represents a challenge to the sovereignty of nation states. See
Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 LAw Q. REv. 97, 117-19 (1948); see also W.
FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 247.
Although Laski focused on the domestic law of the state, his observations have importance to
the international legal system. Laski believed that unless the legal system reflects an equilibrium
between ideas and the interests of those with power, the effectiveness of the legal system and the
state would be in question. See H. LAs i, AUToRITY IN THE MODERN STATE 38, 40, 75-77, 80,
120-22 (1919). Barker called this system "polyarchism." Barker, The DiscreditedState 5 POL. Q.
101, 120 (1915).
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Formerly, because nation-states held most of the power within that
system, international norms essentially mirrored nation-state interests
and activities. Georg Schwarzenberger argued that this situation has
not changed despite the rise in the power of TNCs. He asserted that
the real measure of power in the international arena is military and
political power, with economic power a distant third.5 4 A similar view
is that TNC leaders are highly nationalistic, 55 with both management
and employees owing primary allegiance to their state of nationality

rather than to the business entity. 56 Accordingly, Seymour Rubin argues that TNCs are more an extension of a limited group of dominant
states than an independent international force. 57 If these analyses are
correct, the TNC does not threaten the power of the nation-state. If,
however, international power has shifted away from nation-states toward TNCs, then a legal system that focuses only on the former would
58
be unrealistic and ineffective.
There is good reason to believe that international power has

shifted, making the TNC a real and relatively independent interna-

tional force challenging the nation-state. 59 TNCs are more than the
54. Schwarzenberger, supra note 8, at 129, argues that economic interests do not control
political decisions; instead political and military power determine a country's sphere of influence
and dominate its choice of national policy. If economic interests coincide with political and military interests the combined power is very strong. Schwarzenberger discounts the significance of
public opinion. He argues that although the true motivation for national positions is power politics, international and domestic public opinion mandate public relations posturing. Such public
relations posturing may result in some altruistic deeds, but these deeds are insignificant compared
to the national investment in self-serving policies. See id at 150.
Even Jessup acknowledges the state-centered orientation of international relations: "The inescapable fact is that the world is today organized on the basis of the coexistence of states, and that
fundamental changes will take place only through state action, whether affirmative or negative."
P. JEssur, supra note 10, at 17.
55. See W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 107.

(Few, if any, TNCs have a geocentric outlook; such an outlook is slow to develop, Therefore,
TNC decision-making will continue to be ethnocentric for some time.). But see Timberg, supra
note 24.
56. "IFlunctionalist forces are inherently weak and rarely are able to overcome ideologically
and emotionally inspired counterforces such as pervasive nationalism, strong ethnocentric orientation, and powerful political ideologies." W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 107.
57. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 477-78. Prior to the rise of OPEC the major oil companies
maintained primary allegiance to their stated nationality in their relationships with the Arabian
oil producers. See W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING

STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra

note 1, at 25. Although leaders of TNCs describe themselves as apolitical, they often stress their
domestic contact and tone down the nature of their global orientation. W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 37, 103.

58. See Fatouros, supra note 6, at 951.
59. It is not within the scope of this article to prove or disprove the validity of those views. It
would appear, however, that Rubin's emphasis on patriotism and national identity over and above
the economic power interests of TNC executives is hard to reconcile with TNC behavior (unless,
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sum of the individuals who staff them; their corporate existence cannot
be disregarded. 60 In many instances, their interests do diverge from
those of their host state and state of incorporation 61 and, often, they
of course, one is of the view that TNC interests and actions are congruent with national interest).
Similarly, the economic clout of many of the large TNCs is difficult to ignore. Nevertheless,
neither of these commentators have denied that TNCs represent important centers of power. The
channeling of that power through the nation-state most certainly generates tension between the
government and the TNC. As a consequence of that tension, the community of nations has
moved to develop international codes of conduct for TNCs. By placing the conflict in a process
that will develop international norms, the community has recognized the transnational importance
and power of TNCs. Such an admission and the use of international norm-setting processes
would appear to require the consequential acceptance of a duty to provide a participatory role for
the target entities. See R. EELLS, GLOBAL CoRRATIONs: THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF WORLD

ECONOMIC PowER 223-29 (1972); Miller, supra note 31, at 238; Timberg, supra note 24.
60. The translator's introduction to H. KRABB, supra note 37, at XLII-XLUI, states:
Now collective or corporate units such at these are certainly not mere numbers of individuals standing in quasi-contractual relations to one another. The group itself has ends
which it pursues with more cr less consistency; it has a settled policy which no individual
can modify at will. Its collective character is as fixed as the character of an individual. .. Their effectiveness depends upon the social bonds that unite their members
and upon the need of human nature for group-life such as they afford. The state cannot
make them; it cannot always destroy them. It may recognize them, but in so doing it
merely recognizes something which exists as a fact and which is in no sense produced by
recognition.
See supra note 33.
TNCs based in the U.S. are moving towards internationalized management as an assertion of
independence from the United States. These TNCs do not consider themselves American and do
not act in their home state's interest. MultinationalCorporations Hearings,supra note 41, at 45152 app.B.
61. See generall, Timberg, supra note 24. W. Feld, in NONoovERNMENTAL FORCES AND
WORLD PoLTIcs, upra note 1,at 21-22, lists five problem areas in the relationship between the
TNCs and the third world countries: (I) balance of payments problems, (2) impact on employment, (3) transfer of technology, (4) transfer pricing and taxes, and (5) TNC and host country
policies. Friedmana summed up this conflict when he observed- "The heart of the international
controversy is the conflict between the state's predominant concern and responsibility for the
country and people over which its sovereignty extends, and the interests of the foreign investor in
the reasonable protection of. his investment and economic expectations." Friedmann, The Uses of
GeneralPrinc#oles in the Developmeni of InternationalLaw supra note 1, at 291. W. Feld, in
NONGovERNmENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, sees the conflict in terms of
pressure by the TNC to develop greater economic integration of countries in a global and regional
sense. States resist this integration, seeking independence instead of interdependence. See generally id at 78-80, 84, 105-06, 108. Other commentators emphasize the conflicting loyalties that
employees of TNCs frequently develop. Seegeneral, L STEPHENSON, THE COMING CLASH, THE

IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON NATIONAL STATES (1972).
The failure of the United States embargo on grain sales to the USSR during the Carter Administration is a classic case in point. According to Robert Paarlberg, the embargo failed to affect
the Soviet grain market for three reasons, one of which was the United States' difficulty in maintaining control over volume and direction of its food exports. Without a government grain marketing board, powerful producer and trade groups have traditionally resisted government
restrictions on overseas sales. Paarlberg, Lessons ofthe GraiEmbargo, 59 FOREIGN AFn. 144, 145
(1980). Grain producers and big export firms were initially satisfied with the government's provisions to keep farm prices up, but support began to falter as farm prices did not keep pace with
production costs. Id at 147-48.
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behave as independent actors in the international arena by making
other alliances. The fact that some of the largest TNCs have developed
internal offices that serve the same functions as governmental foreign
ministries and intelligence bureaus further illustrates their independent
62
international perspective.
There are also arguments that address the problems of TNC participation. First, granting TNCs direct participation in the international legal system could create a void if it resulted in a weakening of
state regulation of TNCs without a corresponding strengthening of international regulation. Such a void could essentially remove many
constraints on the TNCs and give them more freedom to expand their
economic and political influence world-wide. Also, actors with contrary
interests, such as national governments, labor, and, arguably, the gen63
eral public, may suffer.
Second, international law is incapable of resolving the most difficult political, military, and economic issues facing the international
community; only the nation-state and its domestic legal system has
been able to do so successfully. This argument against greater TNC
participation recognizes that the nation-state is currently the only possible juridical entity with enough power to keep TNC activities from
62. W. Feld, in NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITIcs, supra note 1,at 59

reports:
Some large corporations such as Royal Dutch-Shell or Standard Oil of New Jersey have
set up large-scale organizations resembling the foreign ministries of national governments. These organizations engage in carefully coordinated information and intelligence
gathering operations through a network of representatives in the major capitals of the
world. At the same time, these representatives are used to present their companies' viewpoints on pertinent issues to the national governments in whose countries they are stationed and seek to influence national decisionmakers in the direction desired by the
corporation management. Periodically, these representatives are called back to headquarters to t',iscuss "foreign policy" problems and to receive new instructions.
International consortia and joint lobbying efforts at the regional, international, and vertical levels
by major TNCs further illustrate TNCs' independent perspectives. See Id at 4-5, 60, see also
Miller, The Corporationas a Priate Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REv. 1539,
1549-57 (1960).
63. Vagts suggests that TNCs are not ready for full international personality because they are
effective organizations only within limited goals and objectives. Vagts, supra note I, at 786. Friedmann wrote:

It would be as dangerous to uncritically accord subjectivity to a private corporation in
international law as it would be to deny its factual participation in the evolution of public international law .... Clearly, any stengthening of the role of the private corporation in public or 'quasi-public' international legal processes must be accompanied by a
corresponding measure of public regulation. Friedmann, supra note 25, at 1158-59. He
refers to Timberg's study, supra note 24.
Feld believes that the spreading influence of the nongovernmental entity is unlikely
to lead to the demise of the state because national, political and administrative elites will
seek to preserve their power and influence against any threats from nongovernmental
entities. W. FELD,NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, ,rpra note 1,at
248. In addition, individuals will look to the state for protection from perceived alien

threats of the big nongovernmental organizations.
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prejudicing other human interests and that, if TNCs acquire significant
international legal personality and thereby become free from state control, the distribution of world power might shift in ways many consider
to be undesirable. 64
Finally, exchanging the state's predominant position in the inter-

national legal system for TNC participation might cripple international
law and relations. Historians attribute the anarchy of Western Europe's dark and early middle ages to its surfeit of sovereigns and semisovereigns. The lack of a unifying force or limited power group made
uniform rules impossible to establish and fueled the anarchy that lasted
until the Renaissance. 65 In keeping with the adage about history re-

peating itself, too many participants in the international legal systemnation-states, TNCs, and other non-state entities-could result today in
66
the same anarchy that plagued pie-Renaissance Europe.
64. See supra note 63. See general. Falk,supra note 25, at 38.
65. Potter wrote:
The chaos which followed the collapse of Roman power lasted for nearly fifteen
centuries. Attempts to replace a unity dictated by Rome with unity imposed by the Papacy and by various pretended successors to the Roman political empire-the empire of
Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Empire of the Hohenstaufen and the Hapsburgs, and
later the Napoleonic attempt-failed of ultimate success. The multiplication of states or
nations founded by Germanic invaders, and of feudal states both small and large which
grew up in all parts of Europe, rendered the development of systematic and stable international relations impossible. There were carried on during all these centuries a great
many activities which resembled Greek and Roman diplomatic activities and which
faintly anticipated the diplomatic activities of modern times... [b]ut the aggregate
results were hardly more impressive in the end than had been the results of the Greek
interstate practice.... [In 1815] the world of nations was still in a condition for which
the term anarchy is hardly too strong.
P. PoTrER, supra note 21, at 24-25. "[N]ot until the period of the Renaissance did the states of
Europe begin to acquire a sufficiently normal size and independence to generate a system of true
international law." Id at 91. See also C. DE VIssCHna, supra note 22, at 3; and T. WALKER,
supra note 8, at 84.
Hedley Bull described Western Christendom in the middle ages as a system where "no ruler
or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of
the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and
(in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above." H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY
254 (1977).
66. Bull wrote,
If modem states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand, with regional and world authorities, and
on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the
concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-medieval form of universal
political order might be said to have emerged.
H. BULL, aupra note 65, at 254-55. He added that "if it were anything like the precedent of Westem Christendom, it would contain more ubiquitous and continuous violence and insecurity than
does the modern state system." Id at 255.
At the present time, the world is experiencing an expansion of the number of nation-states
and perhaps international actors. The number of international actors, however, has fluctuated
over the history of mankind. See W. FRiEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCrURE OF INTERNATIONAL LA, mcpra note I, at 31,214; Lissitzyn, supra note 9, at 87; G. SCHWARZENBERGER,SUpra
note 8, at 100-01. Some observers view the expansion of the number of international actors with
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POSSIBLE FUTuRE TNC PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF
NoRM DEVELOPMENT

The foregoing discussion suggests that the international community may face a dilemma. On the one hand, the influence of international law on community behavior may diminish substantially if

nation-states continue to use it to maintain their control over powerful
TNCs. On the other hand, if international law recognizes a major role
for TNCs, either TNC domination or anarchy might ultimately replace
the nation-state system. Although neither approach necessarily leads
to either extreme, there are compromises that are more likely to lead to
desirable outcomes. The remainder of this article will consider whether
there are desirable alternatives to the current trend toward TNC regu-

lation without direct participation.
A.

Can There Be a Compromise?-Some Problems and Possible
Solutions.
1. InternationalLegal Personality. Any analysis of the question

of TNC participation ought to consider whether a TNC is capable of
having an international legal personality. Unfortunately, there is little
agreement among scholars on the essential elements of legal personality. If the definition focuses on rights and duties under public international law, the TNCs must have substantive and procedural rights and
duties to be properly labeled legal persons. 67 Yet, many scholars recogalarm, predicting chaos unless the nation-state system is reinforced. See Her;, The Territorial
State Revsited Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY, A READER IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 76, 78 (J. Rosenau ed. 1969).
Schwarzenberger, however, cautions against historical analyses of prior international systems. G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 6-7.
67. C. OKEKE, supra note 9, at 1-2, states: "any subject of law must be capable of having
certain rights and duties under the given legal system, any differences in the degree of capacity
notwithstanding." See generally T. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 82-90 (13th ed.
1924). Okeke argues that three essential elements must be present for an entity to be a subject of a
legal system: it must (1) possess duties and responsibility for violating those duties, (2) be capable
of benefiting from legal rights as a direct legal claimant and not as a mere beneficiary, and (3) be
able to enter into contractual or other legal relations with other subjects of the system, in some
capacity. See C. OKinYE, supra note 9, at 19. The fact that these rights and duties must address the
entity directly and not indirectly is stressed by J. SPIROPOLOUS, L'INDIVIDU EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 32 (1928). See also H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, supra note 20, at

342-43. Soviet jurists, such as G. I. Tunkin, consider active participation in the international lawcreating process an important aspect of legal personality. See C. OKEKE, supra note 9, at 12-13
(citing G. TuNwiN, OSNOVY SOVREMENOao MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA (1956)).
C. NORGAARD, supra note 28, at 27-33, defines a subject of law as a person who is "subject of

rights and proceedings" and/or "subject of duties and responsibilities." Id at 33. Thus, he divides the roles along substantive and procedural lines. Lissitzyn takes a more flexible approach,
stating that the term "'personality' is merely a shorthand symbol which denotes that an entity is
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nize varying degrees of legal personality. 8
Despite their disagreement on the elements of legal personality,
many scholars do recognize its two broad sets of attributes: substantive
rights and duties and procedural rights and duties. The attributes or
combinations of attributes the international legal system may give to or
acknowledge in TNCs colors the way TNCs are treated. The options
appear to be:
1. to deny TNCs any rights or duties in the international legal
system, thus affording TNCs no international legal role;
2. to provide effective formal and informal avenues for TNC
participation in the development and enforcement of laws relevant to
their interests, thus giving TNCs limited procedural rights;
3. to recognize the role of TNCs in specific substantive areas of
public international law by providing them with certain acknowledged
rights and duties within the system, thus giving TNCs limited substantive rights and duties;
4. to accord TNCs full participation rights in the international
legal system and subject them to equivalent obligations as states, thus
giving them what may amount to full international legal personality.
Neither the first nor the fourth option is realistic. The first fails to
recognize the TNCs" current importance in the international community and may place an undue strain on international relations and law.
.The fourth alternative credits TNCs with more international power, inendowed by international law with some legal capacities, but does not tell us what particular
capacities it has." Id
68. With reference to the personality of international organizations, Friedmann endorsed the
view that entities might have different degrees of personality in international law. W. FRiEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, at 218. He suggested
that private corporations could have limited personality in the development of legal standards that
affect them. See id at 223-24; see also C. OKExE supra note 9, at 18; McDougal, supra note 1, at
251-52. Ijalaye claims that TNCs are now selective subjects of public international law and that
their contracts are subject to that law. See D. DALAYE,THE EXTENsION OF CORPORATE PERSONALrrY IN INTERNATiONAL LAW 221-23 (1978). He believes international law should selectively
govern certain contracts between businesses and states depending on the contract's subject matter
and importance. See id
The development of "transnational law" has blurred the distinction between public international law and private international law by- recognizing the international character of the law
applicable to international business activities. P. JEssup, Supra note 1, at 2, 15, 106-11.
In response to such developments, some people have advocated establishing a third legal
order apart from national or international law that would deal with commercial activities and the
activities of nonstates in the international sphere. See A. Ross, LAEREBOG iFOLKERET ZUrxG
AGRENHARFN 32 (4th ed. 1961), cited n C. NORGAARD, Mupra note 28, at 305. Unfortunately, a
third legal system would present difficult problems.
Public international law does not lend itself to division into two parts; it is a continuum of
developing law. Thus, all legal rules that are not national law ought to be considered to be international law. Id at 307-08.
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.fluence, and significance than they presently deserve. Many in the international community would actively and strongly resist such an
approach because it, too, diverges substantially from reality. The second and third approaches, however, are flexible options that might result in a more realistic treatment of TNCs and permit the legal system

to gradually conform to that reality.69 These alternatives can best be

explored by focusing on the problems encountered in the development
of international legal norms.
2. Norm Development Problems. Nation-states have sought to
maintain exclusive control over the development of international legal
norms that increasingly address TNC behavior. While some may debate whether TNCs have an international legal duty to follow international norms, few will deny that compliance is a key to successful
multinational business operations in many countries. TNCs also face
"significant pressure from domestic laws or political-economic decisions
to follow international norms even though their role in the norm development process is limited to lobbying individual nation-states.
The quasi-legislative negotiation processes, which are aimed at
producing international agreements, resolutions, and, ultimately, legal
norms, are the primary sources of the body of law that may be made
applicable to TNCs.70 In those forums, representatives of the third
world and socialist countries have generally sought to minimize TNC
interests, favoring instead their own economic and political power visa-vis the western, developed countries. 71 Although the western, developed world and its allies have, in turn, tried to protect the TNCs, they,
too, limit TNC power and influence. Consequently, these forums are
unlikely to produce constructive interaction between TNCs and the
participating states. Once a resolution or convention is adopted, the
struggle will begin over whether the new instrument contains new international legal norms. This legal dispute may rage for some time in
the absence of a single international body that possesses the authority
to decide whether a new resolution or convention embodies binding
legal principles. As a result of this and the independent power of many
TNCs, some TNCs may wage protracted campaigns against these
norms. Such campaigns compound the difficulty. of resolving underlying issues, impugn the integrity of the international legal system, and
generate substantial uncertainty about critical matters of concern.
As mentioned earlier, the development of international TNC
codes has merely tended to convert festering disputes in the political
69. The distinction between these alternatives is based more in legal theory than in fact.
70. See supra notes 2 & 6.
71. Fatouros, supra note 6, at 347; Stanley, supra note 6, at 986-93.
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and economic arenas into legal disputes? 2 By failing to resolve most of
these disputes before formulating normative concepts, the TNCs will
be motivated to use their power and transnationality to frustrate attempts to enforce these norms. Their likely success will prejudice the
credibility of the law-making process.
The international legal system has three alternative responses to
these problems. It may:
1. continue to convert essentially political and economic issues
into legal questions, thereby allowing some international entities to increase their leverage by characterizing their position as that required by
law;,
2. defer the development of new norms applicable to TNCs until
the international community can resolve at least the most difficult political and economic issues it faces;-or
3. adjust the norm development process so that the international
community can promptly resolve at least some of the political and economic issues created by TNCs.
The third world and the socialist countries have sought to guide
the international community toward the first option despite the fact
that the United States and many other western, developed countries
favor the second. Despite the progress of the Code negotiations in the
1970s, the second approach may ultimately prevail; indeed, the marked
slowdown of some negotiations indicates a movement in that direction.
This impasse might be broken, however, if the third approach becomes
more promising. For example, if that approach allowed an adjustment
to the current process, it could avoid the many costs inherent in the first
two choices and might win broad support. Permitting greater TNC
participation in the current process would be such an adjustment and
may facilitate resolution of underlying disputes and minimize conflict
73
over the implementation of the resulting norms.
As mentioned earlier, a few international forums have allowed
such TNC participation and have not suffered as a result. An example
is the International Labor Organization (ILO), whose relative success
can be attributed, in part, to the participation of both business and labor representatives. Despite the ILO's political difficulties, the large
number of international agreements it has brought into force demon72. See supra section l(b); Stanley, supra note 6, at 1006.
73. It would be practically impossible to implement either alternative through the customary
law-making process. Such changes are not easily presented for consideration, adopted, or implemented without a legislative forum. Nevertheless, existing multilateral forums that entertain written proposals offer some hope for addressing and resolving the conflicts between the TNCs and
nation-states that have given rise to the current efforts to develop TNC codes.
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strates its success. 74 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) is another intergovernmental organization that
can attribute part of its success to frequent consultation with business
75
and labor groups.
74. See Shotwell, Introduction in Beguin, supra note 4 at 401; International Labor Office,
International Labor Conventions, Chart of Ratifications (Jan. 1, 1980). These ILO Conventions
have been fairly well observed. Henkin, The Internationalizationof Human Rights, 6 PROC. OF
THE GEN. Eouc. SEMINAR 6 (1977). The ILO tripartite system requires that the Conference delegation from each state party be comprised of two governed representatives, one labor representative, and one employers" representative. Government members of the Conference choose these
representatives in consultation with the country's industrial organization, if such an organization

exists. The employer and the labor representatives, however, are theoretically free to take independent positions from their government's position. Each individual representative has one

vote. But the government sector maintains a substantial blocking vote because a two-thirds vote is
required for the most important decisions of the Conference. Once a Convention is adopted by a
two-thirds majority each member state must submit the Convention to its home parliament for
consideration, regardless of the views of the government representatives. The Governing Body,
which is responsible for fixing the agenda of the Conference, is also a tripartite body. Voting
positions on ILO Committees are generally distributed in equal shares between the three sectors.
The ILO's system has received unusually high marks from observers and critics. The tripartite system and the genuine participation of nongovernmental business and labor representatives
are viewed by many as a key element in the relative success of the ILO. The ILO has had a major
influence on the development of labor laws in many countries and has assured a free and independent flow of information and ideas. It is at the forefront of effective efforts to implement
human rights laws, and of the development of codes of conduct for international business. Commentators have also cited the ILO as an example of nonstate participation in the creation of
international law. See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Part XIII of the
Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 188, 373, art. 1.4 [hereinafter cited as ILO
Constitution];G. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 25-29 (1970); see also
ILO Const. arts. 3.7, 19, 389-390;, C. JENKS, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LAW OF NATIONS: THE ILO
IMPACT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 69-70 (1970); G. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANI-

ZATION 32, 45, 273 (1970); Hanami, Influence ofILO Standardson Law andPracticein Japan, 120
INT'L LAB. REv. 765 (1981); Implementation of ILO Conventions: The Czeckoslovak Case, REv.
INT'L COMM. OF JURISTS 26 (June 1979); Jenks, The SgnjfeanceforInternationalLaw of the 2T"
partite Characterof the InternationalLabour Organization,23 GRoTIus Soc'v 45, 47-49 (1936),
Lafita, Influence of InternationalLabour Conventions on LabourLaw and Social Change in Spain,
118 ILr'r. LAB. REY. 443 (1979); Muruchkov, InternationalLabour Conventionsand BulgarianLegislation, 118 I rr'jL LAB. REv. 205 (1979); Pouyot, The ILO's Freedom ofAssociationStandardsand
Machinery: 4 Summing Up, 121 INTL LAB. REv. 287 (1982); Stoermann, ILO Activities in the
L. & ECON. 347 (1975); Van der Kooy, What is the
Field of M1ultinationalEntearprises, 10 J. IL
Substance of TnOartim in the ILO?, 8 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 73 (1977); Werners, New Dimensionsto
Thoartism in the InternationalLabour Organization, 22 NETH. INT'L REv. 323, 325-27 (1977);
Wolf, ILO Experience in the ImplementationofHuman Alghts, 10 J. IN'T'L L. & EcON. 599 (1975).

q

E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE:

FuNCTIoNALIsM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-

TION 283-91 (1964). The ILO has broadened the definition of "freedom of association" and also
considers such freedom a part of human rights. See A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIoNAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 252-83 (1971); G. JOHNSTON, supra, at 150-62; Wolf, supra, at 60708. For a discussion on work on codes relating to international business, see Stoermann, supra, at
347-53. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text; see, eg., Jenks, supra, at 77-81.
75. The Business Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory
.Committee (TUAC), have served effectively as conduits of information and ideas between industry and the OECD. See, ag., the Report by the Committee on International Investment and
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The description throughout this article of the pitfalls of TNC exclusion and the benefits of TNC participation illustrates that substantial business participation in the development of relevant international
rules is both possible and desirable. Recognizing this, however, is the
smallest part of the current problem; the largest part is obtaining international acceptance of such TNC participation at the forums that are
now focusing on TNC conduct. Historically, these forums, such as the
United Nations, have permitted only the most limited non-state involvement. Therefore, to assure effective participation, TNCs must
clear four hurdles:
1. Currently, the third world nations insist upon expanding the
nation-state's role and power in order to combat the remnants of
colonialism and the real power of the developed countries. The TNC is
seen both as an extension of the power of the western, developed countries and as a new type of colonialism.
2. The socialist countries also regard TNCs as extensions of western power and, therefore, resist expanding their international law role.
Even a parallel expansion of the roles of both TNCs and socialist stateowned corporations would probably be considered advantageous only
to the western world because the state-owned corporations have little
independent power.
3. Allowing TNC participation in the international legal system
presents the practical difficulties of identifying the relatively few TNCs
that should participate, distinguishing between TNCs and other business entities with international interests and power, and determining
76
which forums and what subjects to target for the proposed changes.
Multinational Enterprises, supra note 2, 33-34; see also Sauvant & Lanier, Host Country Councils: Concepts and LegalAspects, in LEOAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATiONAL ENTERPRISES 341, 354-57 (N. Horn ed. 1980).
Similarly, the Economic and Social Committee provides a bridge between the EEC and
EURATOM. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBRoECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 51-52 (1976). Articles 193 through 198 of the EEC Treaty provide for the
establishment of the Economic and Social Committee with a membership representing "the various categories of economic and social life, in particular, representatives of producers, agriculturists, transport operators, workers, merchants, artisans, the liberal professions and of the general
interest." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 1983, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 79-80 (English version). Although seats are allocated on the basis of nationality, the
committee members are appointed by the Council of the EEC and serve in their personal capacity.
See id art. 94, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 80. Specialized sections of this committee may issue reports and
opinions on their subjects of expertise and, in certain instances, the EEC Council and Commission
are required to consult with this committee. See id art. 197-98, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 80-81. Of
course, the relative homogeneity of the OECD and EEC membership has played a pivotal role in
their success.
76. Galtang has proposed such a system. See Galtung,supranote 24, at 181-82. TNCs differ
in character and strength. Rubin, supra note 8, at 908.
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4. If TNCs were allowed to participate in the international legal
system, various non-business groups would also seek that right, if for
no other reason than to provide a counterweight to the influence exerted by the participating TNCs. Thus, the identification of the appropriate participants from that group of international actors would be
difficult.
Each of these presents a formidable obstacle to implementing
TNC participation in the international legal system, but this opposition
is self-defeating. The interests of third world countries, socialist countries, and TNCs and other non-state entities would be best served if the
international legal system conformed to the reality of international
power. If TNCs have such power, their participation would benefit all
interest groups.
B.

*hat Might The Compromise Be?

In order to show that TNC participation can be implemented, it is
useful to examine further the ways in which non-state entities have participated in international negotiations. First, the ILO's accreditation of
business and union representatives as full voting delegates provides the
maximum participant rights.
Congress attempted to integrate business and government in a different way when it passed
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-711 (1935), in 1933. Congress
hoped to achieve economic recovery by stimulating heavy industry and creating governmentsponsored jobs. The NIRA's provisions exempted participating industries from the anti-trust laws
and encouraged big business to draw up enforceable codes for the protection of labor and the
restriction of competition. The NIRA was a declared failure even before the Supreme Court
found it unconstitutional in 1935. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
Historians disagree on the reasons for its demise. Some blame the continuing Depression for
disillusioning the participating business community and fostering noncompliance with the codes.
See D. PERKINS, THE NEW AGE OF FRANKLIN RoosEvELT 1932-45 44 (1957). Others blame the

hurried speed with which the codes were formulated. Enthusiasm and the pressure of economic
hardship caused labor and business to make imprudent concessions. Once the Act began to produce results and economic prosperity slowly returned to industry, industries resisted compliance
with the codes. See R. MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL 293-94 (1966).
The comparison between the NIRA solution, and a hypothetical alliance today between governments and TNCs is flawed. During the Great Depression, the government wanted to
strengthen business; business, in turn, made significant concessions. Faced with a common goaleconomic recovery--business, labor, and the government joined forces. Yet, once the economy
improved and the common threat receded, they again divided and the codes became anachronistic. The relationship between government and business was a one-way street. Business felt no
commitment to government and supported the NIRA provisions for as long as direct benefits
could be realized.
On the other hand, the interests of nation-states and TNCs on the international level are
more intertwined and crystallized. Both TNCs and nation-states have a stake in the goals of the
codes currently under development--the elimination of friction betwen nation-states and TNCs. a
more equitable distribution of wealth, and the faciliation of business operations. See supra note 2.
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The ILO was originally envisaged to address labor-management
relations. In this context, the interests of nation-state governments
were secondary and, as a result, the ILO negotiations were more comparable to labor-management collective bargaining than to discussions
in an interstate negotiating forum. Viewed from that perspective, full
accreditation of business and labor representatives was not a drastic
change from current practice.
Labor-management relations are not at the core of most of the new
TNC norms under consideration. Thus, the question arises whether
this "full accreditation" approach is applicable to other situations. At
first glance, the answer appears to be no. As the ILO has moved away
from its focus on labor-management relations, it has faced greater difficulties.7 7 In most other forums the identification of the interested parties, the balance needed among them, and the role of the interested
public make this approach even less manageable. Furthermore, to accord TNCs full voting participation at these negotiations may present
difficult practical problems. Would all interested TNCs be accorded
such status? If not, how would the selection be made? Perhaps in negotiations involving limited subjects the presence of a small number of
interested TNCs would obviate this problem. In other circumstances,
the selection of participants would present a formidable obstacle to this
procedure. Finally, would TNC participation have to be balanced by
similar accreditation of other interest groups? If so, how would those
groups be identified and selected?
An alternative to the "full accreditation" approach involves accreditation of certain TNCs as non-voting participants. Their status
could be similar to that given international organizations at many international conferences in that they would have the right to attend all
formal meetings, to speak, and to distribute written material. 78 To bal77. In recent years the ILO has become substantially less productive as it has shifted its focus
to broad social issues. See E. HAAs, supra note 3, at 340-46. See generally supra note 74.
78. The United Nation's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has established rules for
the participation of intergovernmental organizations, granting many of them observer status.
Under article 71 of the United Nation's Charter, non-governmental organizations may also consult with ECOSOC. Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, U.N.
Doc. No. E (5715) (1975), grants permanent observer status to certain international organizations.
Observer status in ECOSOC amounts to participation rights without the right to vote. Articles 8084 accord similar rights to non-governmental organizations. Arrangements for Consultations with
Non-Governmental Organizations, E.S.C. Res. 1296, 44 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) U.N. Doc.
No. E/45/48 (1968).
An Appendix to the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/96/Rev. 6 (1974), sets out the Provisional Procedure for Dealing with Communications from
Private Individuals and Non-Governmental Bodies. See id at 12. It provides for a list of communications received by the Security Council to be circulated and for members to request copies of
communications found on the list
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ance the TNCs' participation, similar accreditation might be given to
other identified interest groups and state corporations.
In many situations, such accreditation might be difficult due to the
potentially large number of interested business organizations and other
non-state entities seeking equal accreditation. Their lack of voting
power may, however, make these issues less critical and more easily
resolved. Nevertheless, it might be desirable to start with other
approaches.
A third type of participation combines business and other "balancing" groups to form expert groups analogous to those consulted at various technical conferences. 79 Such groups would observe both the
formal and informal negotiations, serve as vehicles of information exchange, issue reports, and interact with state representatives to develop
new norms. This approach is an improvement over the expert committee system currently used in the TNC Code of Conduct negotiations,
the OECD's BIAC-TUAC system, the EEC system, and the system in
which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) participate at the
United Nations.
Under this "expert group" approach, businesses and other interested groups might be given the right to be present at the forum's formal and informal meetings. With this right they would be privy to
most discussions and would thus be better able both to acquire and to
provide information about the topic of negotiations. This improves
upon OECD practice, which excludes BIAC and TUAC from the interstate negotiations, and UN practice, which admits non-state representatives only to formal meetings.8 0
Also, this approach might include the right of nongovernmental
representatives to participate in some intergovernmental negotiations.
Although the nongovernmental participants would lack voting power,
their presence and participation would make their political and economic power apparent. If effectively used, this exchange of views between state and non-state representatives could bring negotiations
closer to reality, permit them to focus more readily on the central issues, and increase the number of issues negotiated at these more visible, open forums. The points of view and information these entities
79. Charney, Technology and InternationalNegotiations, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1982). This
would contrast with the rather amorphous role played by NGOs at the United Nations. See W.
FELD, supra note 1, at n.51 & n.78.

80. Such participation at the UN is inadequate because unfortunately, those sessions are
most often devoted to procedural matters and the conduct of a ritual negotiation necessary to

-formalize previously negotiated results. As a consequence, access to information is limited as is
the ability to interact with the state representatives.
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can deliver to these open negotiations are also likely to have a
profound effect on the product. While these negotiations may become
more complicated as a result, the anticipated costs may be justified if
the issues that are truly ripe for settlement are effectively resolved.
Finally, business interests ought to be represented primarily by industry employees and officers, instead of officials of such industry associations as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).81
Although organizations such as the ICC have a valuable role to play,
the direct participation of business representatives would allow them to
speak with authority, to share their familiarity with the details of specific problems, and thereby to gain additional benefits.82 Regardless of
the approach, the objectives are the same-to ensure useful and direct
interaction between nation-states and business and to draw business
representatives into the process of developing international norms.
The drawbacks of such expanded business participation include
the possible stagnation of international norm development and the subordination of public interest to business interests. Even the inclusion of
several other interest groups will be viewed by many as a face-saving
move that will not balance the power of business groups. Many private
citizens of the western, developed world and third world and socialist
countries will probably regard such balancing group participation as a
dilution of their own influence. The ideal method of bringing industry
into the international arena will effectively account for the needs and
interests of other power groups. The "expert group" approach outlined
above may come closest to this ideal. Although there are risks inherent
in any approach, it should be clear that the international legal system
risks losing contact with political and economic realities if it effectively
excludes business and other significant power groups.
81. Such secondary representation has been used by the ILO, and by the Expert Committee
to the negotiations on the Code of Conduct for TNCs.
82. A good example of practice that is consistent with this view is found in the BIAC, which.
has pursued a balanced approach in which representatives from both industry and industry associations participate. Whether the TNCs will be willing to participate in the discussions or negotiations remains unclear. So long as TNCs do not view the forum as hopelessly hostile to their
interests there is no reason to believe that they would be reluctant to participate. Indeed, if nationstates provide a reasonably fair forum, TNCs will want to participate in order to influence the
outcome in their favor. After all, most TNCs are themselves interested in the establishment of
uniform international norms. See supra note 48.
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PARTICIPATION IN THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RULES:

TNC

PARTICIPATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Once a new norm is established, the subjects to whom it applies
are expected to conform. Although procedural steps can be taken at
international negotiations to increase industry involvement in international law development, the international legal system does not have the

means to ensure its compliance with that law. Thus, the question arises
whether TNCs, like states, should have a direct duty to conform to ap-

plicable rules of international law. If so, how can the community be
assured of that conformity in the absence of an enforcement authority?
The opportunities for TNC participation in international law enforcement appear remote. Positivists would probably consider this

conclusion apparent because they contend that only nation-states have
the governmental structure necessary for enforcing legal norms. Thus,
no such structure either exists or could likely be established at the international level.8 3 Even if TNCs were to have rights and obligations

under international law, there would be no mechanism to encourage
them to perform these obligations.
Even non-positivists would probably view TNC participation in

law enforcement as unworkable. According to them, nation-states have
long accepted international legal obligations because they share inter-

ests in maintaining certain types of mutual relations. Two significant
factors at the foundation of these interests are the nation-state's territoriality and the identifiable population for which it is responsible.8 4 In
this light, the question whether TNC participation in norm implementation is possible translates to whether entities such as TNCs, with

neither population nor territory, share enough interests with nationstates to interact successfully in the rudimentary international legal

system.85
83. Rostow, The Needfor a Treaty, in GLOBAL COMPANIES, supra note 42, at 159-60.

84. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

§

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

201 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
85. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100. T.S.
No. 881, 169 U.N.T.S. 19, 3 Bevans 145. Modem international law probably originated with the
development of the sovereign territorial state. Jessup described the period prior to the development of territorial states:
[E]ven in the early feudal period there was "no territorial law as we today understand
it-a body of law applying to all within the land, whether foreigners or not"; the system
of personal law continued. Because thieves, swindlers, and murderers traveled from city
to city and each city was equally affected by their depredations, the malefactors were
likely to be punished in whatever city they were found regardless of the place where they
had committed the crime.
.P. Jassup, supra note 1, at 42. Walker argues that the development of the territorial sovereigns
gave rise to legal principles governing their relations. See T. WALKER, supra note 8, at 182, 184-
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These concrete attributes of nation-states mandate that their governments continually consider the need to preserve the more tangible
characteristics of their existence. 86 Not only do territory and population serve as targets of retribution in cases of violations of international
law, but they require that all actions be taken with reference to the
preservation of these tangible elements.
It is not apparent that TNCs have a sufficient commonality of interests to operate successfully within this rudimentary legal system. Although TNCs are largely separated from fixed territories and
populations, they all have employees and most have interests in real
and personal property. Compared to nation-states, however, those elements can be considered relatively expendible and interchangeable
with other employees and property around the globe. Consequently,
their interests need not be formulated with as great an emphasis on the
specific tangible elements in their possession. The costs of misbehavior
can therefore be imposed in more limited ways and can be minimized
by facile management decisions.
The actions of national liberation movements and other groups
seeking international status further illustrate the differences between
territorial and nonterritorial entities. Prior to assuming control of the
target state, national liberation movements have traditionally demonstrated little respect for the international legal system or for such be85. It is not an accident of history that territory and population are prerequisites to statehood.
Traditionally, the core of substantive international law has been the management of these charac-:
teristics; only relatively recently has international law started managing less tangible subjects such
as economic relations. International rules in this new frontier have been motivated largely by the
mutual economic interests of and benefits to nation-states. It is also clear that the rules regarding
the behavior of large bureaucracies play a large part in international behavior. Economic selfinterest and bureaucratic behavior are common to governments and the managements of TNCs..
See generall FROM MAX WEBE: EssAYs INSOCIOLOGY 196-244 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. &
trans. 1958). Notwithstanding these new legal frontiers, modern international law is still built on
the foundation of territory and population and itmay be difficult for TNCs to exercise substantive
rights and duties in the same manner as nation-states.
86. Galtung stresses the functional distinctions between the territorial (T) and nonterritorial
(NT) actors on the international plane:
Underlying any analysis of this sixth continent [of NT actors] is one fundamental factor.
the variable of communication/transportation speed and capacity. Basically constant for
a million or two years of human history, it has increased exponentially since the first
successful attempts early last century to install steam engines in ships (Fulton) and in
locomotives (Stephenson). The system of territorial actors (Ts) developed in the first
phase with spatial contiguity as a basic and undisputed assumption. That the ensuing
exponential growth of transportation/communication should lead to the emergency of
nonterritorial aciors (NTs) is hardly strange....
Galtung,supra note 24, at 158.
This impact of territoriality on the interrelations of Ts as distinct from NTs is clear. He says:
"Territorial space is finite and clearcut; if a new territorial actor is to be carved out, it will be at the
expense of somebody else's power over the slice of territory. But nonterritorial space is without
limitation ..
" Id at 161.
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havior-controlling concepts as Reaoolitik and Staatsraeson. Once they
assume control of the target territory and population, however, they
rapidly accept these concepts.8 7 Galtung, in his study of the nonterritorial system, has recognized the relevance of territoriality in the behavior of international actors.88 He identifies two separate political
systems operating in the international arena-the territorial (T) and
nonterritorial (NT) systems. He says, "the NT system has its own dialectic, its own sources of growth; it is much less dependent on what
happens in the system of states .... -89 Thus, it appears that territoriality may be fundamental to the nation-state system and, particularly,
to the effectiveness of the system of international law.
If this view of the international system has merit, one must conclude that TNC compliance with public international law would be unlikely in the absence of a formal law enforcement system. Therefore,
the primary duty to encourage subjects of international law to observe
the law must remain with the individual nation-states. This approach
preserves the traditional nation-state leverage over non-state entities
and its use of the effective, positivist-type enforcement systems it currently provides. 90 If, after the development of norms regarding TNC
behavior, a commonality of interests evolves among these international
87. J. LADOR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at 167, has stressed

that the legal sphere of State-preparing was situated on a level essentially different from
Staatsraeson and Reolpolltik, but that those who were the leaders of such State-preparreality of
the territorial
with responsibilities
ingsoon
[entities],
would
have inexorably
to switch overensuing
to both from
Stasraeson
and Realpolilk
are burdened
as they
as

their new-founded State. competing
They are caught
in theofincompatibility
(territorial)
terrthe same
to their
other nations of
pretension
existence with whatever
tory...
See also id at 143. J. LADOR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at 143, points out that territorial entities
introduce into the law the logic and spirit of their territorial existence. See also W. FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 233.
88. See Galtung, supra note 24. Galtung believes there are two contemporary international
communities: the community of states and the community of nonterritorial actors. He labels the
system of nonterritorial (NT) actors as the sixth continent, which he believes is one of the most
significant of all the continents in world politics. See id at 158. Galtung concludes that there
ought to be a two-chambered UN with one chamber representing the nonterritorial actors and the
other representing the territorial actors. He expects that this would result in a world allegiance
that would be of high salience and would change individual loyalty from the territorial actors to
the nonterritorial actors. See id at 184-85; see also J. LADOR-LEDERER, supra note 9, at 11, 381.
89. Galtung, supra note 24, at 159.
90. It has been argued that "'a sound international order cannot be built on the wreckage of
nation-states.' The nation-state provides the internal order and sense of political community that
underlie democratic institutions. . . . Our political norms have not kept pace with the evolution
of traasnational political roles." Nye, Two Views of World Order, in GLOBAL COMPANIES, supra
note 42, at 164. Conflict-resolving mechanisms used domestically by nation-states are useful, see
Rubin, supra note 8, at 14, and should be preserved. Rubin argues that the sovereignty of nation'states has not been weakened by the increased presence of TNCs. Rubin, supra note 1,at 475. For
a documentation of national and international efforts to regulate TNCs, see id at 478-88.
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actors, TNCs might be recognized as having greater capacities. Without that commonality of interests, however, nation-states will continue
to resist greater TNC participation in the international legal system despite the stresses such resistance places on the system.
A hybrid system, keeping law enforcement as a nation-state responsibility and opening law development to TNC participation, might
permit the nation-state to keep its influence and power while providing
the flexibility that would prevent international law from losing touch
with reality. Such a system also has the potential to make the interests
of TNCs and nation-states more alike, thereby making possible future
TNC participation in all aspects of the international legal system.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In light of the undeniable movement towards greater international
regulation of international business, the question arises whether the
system used to develop these new rules is well designed. Prohibiting
direct business participation in the development of these rules poses
certain risks: (1) that the rules may be impracticable, (2) that the developments will needlessly promote conflict between nation-states and
TNCs, and (3) that the international community's current respect for
the international legal system will diminish. Nevertheless, including in
the rulemaking process representatives of organizations with direct interests in the rules under consideration might both minimize these risks'
and maximize the positive results.
This article has focused on the value of expanding the TNCs' role
in this law-making process. Certain TNCs have already acquired substantial economic power that in some ways rivals the power of the nation-state. Yet, although juridical personality in international law has
expanded in recent years, the present international structure does not
take full account of the international importance of TNCs and other.
non-state entities possessing such economic power. The international
legal community has failed to give these entities a role because of the
power struggles among nation-states and the perceived threats to the
nation-state system that they represent. Continuing this conflict imposes unnecessary costs on the international legal system. The effectiveness of international law depends largely upon the legitimacy of its
rules. Because the law development process is the vehicle by which
these rules are legitimized, a process that excludes powerful international actors will become less legitimate in the eyes of the excluded
actors and will breed disrespect for the international system as a whole.
In order to avoid these adverse consequences, excluded power
groups should be given a direct role in the development of the new
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international norms that concern them. Representation through na.tional governments is not sufficient, primarily because government interests often do not coincide with the interests of these groups. Direct
involvement facilitates communication within and commitment to the
international legal system. However, because of the conflicting concerns of these states and interest groups, the independent participation
of TNCs and other non-state entities in the creation and enforcement
of international law is best achieved through an evolutionary process.
The issues discussed in this article are products of the development
of TNC power and state efforts to control that development through
international regulation. Greater TNC participation in the international legal process may actually strengthen the system in the face of
this power struggle. Thus, it is important that some steps be taken in
response to this reality and in preparation for the day when, perhaps,
nonterritorial entities are the more significant actors in international
affairs.

